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Abstract
This Article undertakes a review of maritime interception and rescue-at-sea practices by evaluating the nature and scope of legal protection that each mechanism affords to refugees encountered
at sea. For both interception and rescue, the underlying legal framework and State practice will be
discussed, and longstanding protection gaps inherent in each will be examined. Attention is then
turned to recent protection improvements in both rescue and interception. These recent changes
will be analyzed for their strengths and weaknesses, and some suggestions for improving maritime
interception safeguards are offered.

IRREGULAR MARITIME MIGRATION:
REFUGEE PROTECTION ISSUES IN
RESCUE AND INTERCEPTION
BarbaraMiltner*
No one knows how many boat people have died, but
thousands have been rescued at sea. In the reality of dangerous journeys undertaken to gain access to reluctant coastal
states, the time-honoured maritime traditions of rescue at sea
collide with the growing determination
of states to prevent
1
illegal entry to their territory.

INTRODUCTION
2
Irregular maritime migration is not a new phenomenon.
What is relatively new is the growing trend towards mixed migration flows, whereby refugees move within population flows that
include "both forced and voluntary movements." ' The present
trend toward mixed migration means that refugees are likely to
be present among the populations targeted by States' migration
control tactics, whether as persons traveling in makeshift, unseaworthy vessels, using forged documents, resorting to the use
of a smuggler, or even among those unwittingly ensnared by a
trafficker. 4 It also means that this same group of individuals is

* Lecturer, Robert Gordon University Department of Law. Many thanks are due
to The British Academy, which supported my presentation of an early draft of this Article at the IASFM 10th biennial conference in Toronto. I also owe a debt of gratitude to
Professor Stephen Legomsky of Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, for
his generous time, careful reading, and thoughtful comments on an early draft.
Thanks are also due to Dr. Michelle Foster, Sr. Lecturer at the University of Melbourne,
for her comments and suggestions for improvement. Any errors or inaccuracies are
mine alone.
1. United Nations ("U.N.") High Comm'n for Refugees ("UNHCR"), THE STATE
OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 2006, HUMAN DiSPiACEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, CH. 2
SFEGUADIN, ASYLUM 2006 (Oxford Univ. Press).

2. UNHCR Global Consultations on Int'l Protection, Background Note on the Protection of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Rescued at Sea 1 (Mar. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Background Note], http://Aw-.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3e5f35e94.pdf
(last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
3. UNHCR Global Consultations on Int'l Protection, Refugee Protection and Migration Control: Perspectives from UNHCR and IOM 2, U.N. Doc. EC/GC/01/11
(May 31, 2001) [hereinafter Perspectives from UNHCR and IOM].
4. Smuggling involves procuring illegal entry of persons into a country for financial benefit, whereas trafficking involves control over persons by means of threat, use of
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more vulnerable to distress situations at sea requiring rescue.
There are many articles examining interception from a
human rights or refugee law perspective, 5 and others that examine it from a law of the sea standpoint," and still fewer undertake to examine interception from both perspectives. 7 This Article represents an attempt to examine the tension between these
usually separate strands of law to identify gaps in refugee protection at sea affecting notjust the migration-control tactic of interception, but also the universal humanitarian tradition of rescue
at sea.
In recent years the importance of jointly addressing maritime interception and rescue issues has become more widely recognized by both scholars and the international community.8 In
February 2005, the Office of the United Nations ("U.N.") High
Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") announced a one-year
project with the European Commission to gather information
about mixed migration trends in the Mediterranean. 9 One imforce, or coercion for the purpose of exploitation such as prostitution, forced labor, or
slavery. See Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, G.A. Res.
55/25, Annex I1, at 41, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001); see also Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, at 32, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001).
5. See, e.g., Attila Ataner, Refugee Interdiction and the OuterLimits of Sovereignty, Vol. 3,
No. 1, J.L. & EQUALLTY, Spring (2004); see also Andrew Brouwer &Judith Kuinin, Inter
ception and Asylum: When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide, 21 (4) RLFU(E 6
(2003) (analyzing interception measures and effects); See generally Arthur Helton, Securing Refugee Protection in the Americas: The InterAmerican System on Human Rights and the
Rights of Asylum-Seekers, 6 SW. J.L. & TRADL Am. 129 (1999) (discussing background of
recent migration of refugees in America, specifically Cuban and Haitian refugees).
6. See Jon Jacobson, At-Sea Interception of Alien Migrants: InternationalLaw Issues, 28
WILLIXMETTY. L. Rrv. 811, 811-19 (1992); see also Canadian Council for Refugees
("CCR") Int'l Workshop, Interdiction and Refugee Protection: Bridging the Gap, Ottawa, Canada (May 29, 2003), available at http://wx.ccrweb.ca/interdictionproceedings.PDF
(meeting discussing practical policy alternatives to current interdiction measures).
7. One of the first to examine the law of the sea from a human rights perspective
was Bernard Oxman, Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 36 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'I L. 399 (1997). More recent work directly examining the
legality of interception from both perspectives includes Mark Pallis, Obligations of States
Towards Asylum Seekers at Sea: Interactions and Conflicts Between Legal Regimes, 14 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 329 (2002).
8. For an excellent and timely policy-based discussion of the intersection between
maritime interceptions and rescue-at-sea, seeJoanne van Sein & Betsy Cooper, The New
'BoatPeople'.- EnsuTing Safety and Determining Status, MIGRATION POLICY INST., Jan. 2006;
see also Interception and Rescue at Sea, Breakfast Briefing, MIGRATION POLICx INST., June 15,
2005, available at http://8,ww.migrationpolicy.org/events/050615.php.
9. UNHCR, Project to Shed Light on Africa-Europe Transit Migration, UNHCR News
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portant aspect of this project has been to examine refugee protection needs of those rescued or intercepted at sea." The project, designed to formulate a regional migration strategy in response to Mediterranean migration movements, was launched in
recognition of the "human tragedy associated with the rising
death toll at sea," which has been recognized as contributing "an
added dimension of 'humanitarian crisis' to these maritime
movements."" The Mediterranean is but one example of the
growing humanitarian crisis at sea. 2 News articles regularly report dangerously unsafe migration attempts along a variety of
maritime routes worldwide, from Somalia to Yemen,' Ecuador
to the United States,' 4 and Libya to Italy,' 5 among others. The
issue of migrants encountered at sea is not a new one, but it is
certainly one encountering a renaissance.1
Despite the differences in underlying policy objectives, rescue-at-sea and maritime interceptions share a great deal of common ground. A weakening maritime rescue regime in conjunction with an aggressively expanding interception framework
Stories (Feb. 1, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/printtblNEWS&id-41ffa0f54.
10. So far the project has convened a meeting of experts in Athens in September
2005, as well as a meeting of State representatives that took place in Madrid in May
2006. See UNHCR, Reconciling Protection Concerns with Migration Objectives, Background
Discussion Paper, Meeting of State Representatives on Rescue at Sea and Maritime Interception in the Mediterranean, p.2, Madrid (May 23-24, 2006).
11. See id. at 1.
12. See Stephen Legoisky, The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program,
presented at The Right to Seek Asylum? The Pacific, Mediterranean and Caribbean
Plans Compared, Prato, Italy (Sept. 26-27, 2005), in 18 INT'L J. REFU(;E L. 677 (2006);
see also Michael Pugh, Europe'sBoat People: Maritime Cooperation in the Mediterranean,INST.
FOR Sr it RIvv STU)ES, Western European Union, Chaillot Paper 41, Paris, (July 2000).
13. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Somalis Brave a Sea of Perilsfor Jobs Abroad, N.Y. TiMES, May
29, 2006, at Al.
14. See Ginger Thompson & Sandra Ochoa, DangerousPassage: From Ecuador by Sea
by a Back Door to the US.: A Migrant's Grim Sea Voyage, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, at I
(citing U.S. immigration and military authorities' statistics that from 2000-2004, "at least
250,000 people have left Ecuador on fishing boats," representing nearly ten times number of Haitians undertaking a sea voyage to the United States during the 1990s).
15. See UNHCR, Shipowners Facing 'Unfair' Migrant Rescue Burden, says UN Refugee
Section, NLws ARCHIVES, Sept. 14, 2005 (quoting Vincent Cochetel, UNHCR's Deputy
Director of Department of Int'l Protection as saying: "In 2004, at least 2,000 people
died at sea whilst attempting to cross from Libya to Italy").
16. See generally Ketty Kehayioylou, UN and Maritime Experts Draw Up Life-Saving Recommendationsfor Those in Peril on the Sea, UNHCR News Stories (Sept. 14, 2005), available
at http: //wvw.unhcr.org/ cgi-bin /texis /vtx/ news /opendoc.htmtbl-NEWS&id 43283d
744.
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combine to pose significant protection risks to refugees encountered at sea. Most notably are an increased risk of refoulement, a
lack of systematic and uniform access to asylum procedures, and
obstructed access to temporary protection of a uniform standard.' 7 Ultimately, neither rescue nor interception adequately
accommodates refugee protection.'
This Article undertakes a review of maritime interception
and rescue-at-sea practices by evaluating the nature and scope of
legal protection that each mechanism affords to refugees encountered at sea. For both interception and rescue, the underlying legal framework and State practice will be discussed, and
longstanding protection gaps inherent in each will be examined.
Attention is then turned to recent protection improvements in both rescue and interception. These recent
changes will be analyzed for their strengths and weaknesses, and
some suggestions for improving maritime interception safeguards are offered.
I. INTERCEPTION
Despite the growing prevalence of interception, much confusion and ambiguity persist with regard to the exact meaning of
the term, and this confusion has been compounded by an array
of associated terminology.2" Terms that are frequently used in
22
21
reference to interception include interdiction, push-backs,
non-entr&,23 and non-admission measures, 24 although each of
17. See van Sein & Cooper supra note 8.
18. See generally Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Refugees and Responsibility in the Twenty-First
Centuo: More Lessons Learnedfrom the South Pacific, 12 PAC. Rim L. & Poi yJ. 23 (2003)
(discussing Tampa incident as a reminder that refugee regime is not a seamless web,
even if certain core and often competing principles retain their normative power).
19. See van Selm & Cooper supra note 8.
20. See Andrew Brouwer & Judith Kumin, Interception and Asylum: When Migration
Control and Human Rights Collide, 21 RiruCi 6, 7 (Dec. 1, 2003).
21. This term has become almost standard in North America as applied to maritime interceptions. See generally Sale v.Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
22. This term tends to have a narrower meaning in the maritime context. It has
been used interchangeably with interdiction, but it tends to characterize the specific
practice of intercepting a foreign vessel, usually inside a State's territorial waters, and
forcibly repelling it back out onto the high seas, thereby preventing access to a State's
territory or territorial waters. See Human Rights Watch, Stemming the Flow: Abuses Against
Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees 113 (Sept. 2006), http://'w.ihrw.org/reports/
2006/libya0906/libya0906.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
23. SeeJames C. Hathaway, The Emerging Politics of Non-Entre, 91 RFU(;EEs 40, 40-41
(1992); see also Ataner supra note 5, at 23;Jessica C. Morris, The Spaces in Between: Ameri-
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these may connote slightly narrower or broader meanings than
"interception" itself. For purposes of this Article, reference will
be limited to the term interception, which has recently been defined broadly enough to encompass all of the various terms
listed above. 25 This section will examine the meaning of the
concept before addressing State practice and the underlying policy context of interception.
A. Meaning and Definition of Interception
At present, there is no universal definition of interception,
notwithstanding recent attempts.2 6 In 2000, UNHCR proposed
to define interception as:
[A]ll measures applied by a State, outside its national territory, in order to prevent, interrupt, or stop the movement of
persons without the required documentation crossing international borders by land, air or sea, and
making their way to
27
the country of prospective destination.
This definition reflects and emphasizes the extraterritorialcharacter of interception. The extraterritorial aspect has important legal ramifications regarding State duties under international
treaty law, and will be explored in further detail below. For purposes of this Article, an extraterritorial act is considered to involve action by one State that takes place either in the territory
of another State or in international territory, such as the high
seas.28 It is the recognition of the extraterritorial nature of interceptions that makes this definition so relevant today.
Notwithstanding its potential relevance, the 2000 UNHCR
definition was supplanted three years later by a new definition.
can and AustralianInterdiction Policies and Their hnplicationsfor the Refiugee ProtectionRegime,

21

REFUGE

51, 52 (2003).

24. SeeJens Vedsted-Hansen, Non-Admission Policies and the Right to Protection: Refugees Choice Versus States'Exclusion?, in REITT(,T RICHTS & RIAMITIES: EVOLVIN, INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS & REGiNrS 269, 269-70 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds.,
1999).
25. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Interception
Measures, No. 97 (LIV) (Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Conclusion No. 97].
26. See id.; see also UNHCR Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program ("ExCom"), Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees: The International
Framework and Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach
10, EC/50/SC/
CRP.17 (June 9, 2000) [hereinafter Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees].
27. See UNHCR ExCom, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, supra note
26,
10.
28. See BLAMK's LANA
DICTIONARY 869 (8th ed. 2004).
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In 2003, the Executive Committee2 9 ("ExCom") of UNHCR issued a Conclusion" redefining interception as:
[O]ne of the measures employed by States to:
(i) prevent embarkation of persons on an international journey;
(ii) prevent further onward international travel by persons
who have commenced their journey; or
(iii) assert control of vessels where there are reasonable
grounds to believe the vessel is transporting persons contrary
to international or national maritime law;
where, in relation to the above, the person or persons do not
have the required documentation or valid permission to
enter; and that such measures also serve to protect the lives
and security of the traveling public as well as persons
being
31
smuggled or transported in an irregular manner.
This definition maintains the focus on State intent to interrupt
movement by undocumented persons, but it also makes several
significant changes to the earlier definition. There are four
noteworthy aspects to this proposed definition.
First, the ExCom definition deletes any explicit mention of
an extraterritorial element. Whereas the Standing Committee's
earlier definition described interception as "all measures applied
by a State, outside its national territoy,"3 2 the ExCom definition
eliminates any such reference. 3 ' This change is noteworthy
since extraterritoriality had previously been considered a dominant, if not always necessary element of interception in practice."4 In the maritime context in particular, interceptions may
29. Established by ECOSOC in 1958, ExCoin is made up of seventy Member States

and meets annually to approve the UNHCR program and budget, and advise on international protection with UNHCR, its intergovernmental and non-governmental organi-

zation ("NGO") partners. See UNCHR Website, http:// ',.tunhcr.org

(last visited Nov.

3, 2006).
30. Consensus reached by ExCom in the course of its discussions is expressed in
the form of Conclusions on International Protection ("ExComn Conclusions"), which
are not formally binding, but offer persuasive authority in interpreting international
protection issues. See generally UNHCR ExCom, Conclusions on International Protection, http://ww.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/excom?id-3bblcb676 (last visited Nov.
3, 2006).
31. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25.
32. See UNHCR ExCom, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, supra note
26,
17-19.
33. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25.
34. SeeJ.C. HATHANAAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAN, 312,
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occur in a State's territorial waters or on the high seas, but current State practice reflects a definite trend toward high seas interceptions, as States begin to take advantage of the legal ambiguities that flow from intercepting vessels further out to sea '- It
would thus seem counterproductive to remove from the definition a characteristic feature just as it is becoming more relevant
to current State practice.
One consequence of eliminating the extraterritorial element from the definition of interception is overbreadth. By removing the extraterritorial component, the scope of interception (to "prevent embarkation," "prevent further onward international travel," or to "assert control of vessels" in relation to
those without proper documentation) captures a radically wider
range of activities, including those not traditionally viewed as interception." By failing to acknowledge the existence of interceptions occurring on the high seas, involving extraterritorial
disembarkation or processing, 7 or trapping asylum seekers and
refugees within their state of origin,3" the ExCom definition ob312-13 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005) (characterizing interception as "extraterritorial
refoulement").
35. See Bruce Finley, U.S. 'Extends Borders' to S. American Coasts, A1iz. DAILY STAR,
Dec. 19, 2004, at A17 (citing a U.S. Department of Homeland Security policy of "pushing our borders out" near the coast of Ecuador).
36. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25. Preventing embarkation from inside the intercepting State via the imposition of exit visas or border closures
to prevent departure would technically qualify under the new definition. The legality
of many such in-counwy activities implicates Article 12(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") involving the right to leave any country. See
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: France,
20, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.80 (Aug. 4, 1997); seealso Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: Austria,
11, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.103 (November 19,
1998); seegenerally HATHAWAY, supra note 34. Other activities such as detention within
transit States-often used for irregular migrants awaiting processing, hearings, deportation, or removal-would also be captured under the ExCom definition.
37. See generally Amnesty Int'l, Unlawful and Unworkable--Amnesty International's Views on Proposals for Extra-Territorial Processing of Asylum Claims, Al Index:
IOR 61/004/2003 (June 18, 2003).
38. See generally Mark Gibney, Katarina Tomasevski &Jens Vested-Hansen, Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 12 HA1v. HuM. Rs.J. 267 (1999)
(analyzing conflict in human rights law as regards universal versus state responsibility);
see generally RICK LAWSON, Concept of Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Acts of State, in STATE,
SOVREI(,NTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Gerard Kreijen et al. eds., 2002); Ralph
Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"? ExtraterritorialState Action and InternationalTreaty Law on Civil
and PoliticalRights, 26 MicH.J. INT'L L. 739 (2005) (arguing that international treaties
on civil and political rights do apply in "wartime" context).
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scures the questionable legality of many aspects of modern day
interception practices.
A second feature of the ExCom definition is its explicit distinction between interception and rescue. The Preamble of the
document emphasizes that, "when vessels respond to persons in
distress at sea, they are not engaged in interception."39 This distinction recognizes the predominantly humanitarian character
of rescue, in contrast to the migration control policy objectives
that underpin interception practices. Although the ExCom attempt to distinguish between these two practices is a useful starting point, there remains an inadequate distinction between rescue and interception, and more is needed to clarify the boundaries that define each activity. This issue will be explored more
fully in Section IV.B.
Third, the ExCom definition of interception simultaneously
blurs the line between rescue and interception by suggesting
that interception "also serve[s] to protect the lives and security
of the travelling public as well as persons being smuggled or
transported in an irregular manner."40 Humanitarian goals may
be achieved in the interception of trafficking victims or smuggled persons exposed to serious harm, but the net result of interception activities as a generalized practice is less clear.4 '
Whatever the humanitarian benefits to interception, the practice
is driven largely by migration control and national security con39. UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Michael Pugh, Drowning Not Waving: Boat People and Humanitarianism
at Sea, 17J. RTFIIGEE STUD. 50, 62 (2004). Because statistics are not available, there is no
way of knowing how many refugees encountered at sea are summarily subjected to
refoulement. Further, it is recognized that increasingly draconian migration control efforts reduce legal migration options and in turn drive the demand for illegal migration
options such as smuggling. UNHCR, Update on Global Consultations on International
Protection
11, UN Doc. EC/51 /SC/CRP.12 (May 30, 2001) [hereinafter Update on
Global Consultations] (noting that "[i] nterception on land and at sea, security checks
and other measures have made legal access to a territory where asylum can be claimed
increasingly difficult. Resort to smugglers has increased, as has the exposure to trafficking of women and children moving on their own."). This vicious cycle is reflected in
UNHCR's repeated requests that States focus more on alternative legalized migration
routes, and less on border enforcement measures. See generally UNHCR ExCom, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, supra note. 26; UNHCR, Co-Operation to Address the Irregular Movement of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: Elements for an International Framework (Mar. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Elements for an International Framework], http://www.unhcr.bg/eventsrecords/2005/2005 03 17 ld-present-en.pdf
(last visited Nov. 3, 2006); UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25.
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cerns, as recognized by the International Organization for Migration4 2 ("IOM") when it observed that States "which have the
ability to do so find that intercepting migrants before they reach
their territories is one of the most effective measures to enforce
their domestic migration laws and policies."4 Issues of effectiveness aside, the attempt to portray interception as a humanitarian
practice contributes to the blurred lines between interception
and rescue by conflating migration control tactics with humanitarian rescue operations. Such language should be removed, as
it directly undermines the explicit attempt to distinguish interception from rescue.
Finally, the ExCom definition makes explicit reference to
physical interception practices when it speaks of "control of vessels" in contrast to the general reference to "all measures" proposed by UNHCR in 2000." This explicit reference to a particular subset of interceptions indicates that physical interception
has become important enough in its own right to warrant explicit recognition apart from administrative interception measures, which are briefly discussed in the next section.
B. Interception in Practice

As noted in UNHCR's proposed definition, interception is
generally understood to constitute all extraterritorialactivities applied by a State to prevent entry to its territory by undocumented
migrants. 4 5 Interception activities can be further categorized as
either administrative or physical in nature.4 6 Administrative
measures have evolved significantly in the last two decades and
encompass a broad range of activities, 4 7 including: implementation of visa requirements, carrier sanctions (for failure to detect
42. IOM is an intergovernmental organization that is not part of the U.N. system.
It works with U.N. bodies and individual governments to address a variety of migrationrelated issues such as counter-trafficking, refugee resettlement, IDP returns, etc., and is
a frequent player in regional consultative processes.
43. UNHCR, Perspectives from UNHCR and 10M, supra note 3,
14.
44. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25,

iii.

45. See UNHCR ExCom, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, supra note
26.
46. See id.,

12-13. For an overview of tactics, including interception, adopted by

States to bar access to domestic asylum procedures, see STEPHEN LF(,OMSKV, IMMIGRATION AND REFLUGEE LAw AND PROC EDURE 1095-1135 (4th ed., 2005).

47. See Penelope Mathew, Legal Issues Concerning Interception, 17 GEO. I. L.J. 221,
221-49 (2003); see also HATHAWAY, supra note 34, at 40. See generally Ataner, supra note 5;
Morris, supra note 23; Vedsted-Hansen, supra note 24, at 269-70.
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and deter irregular migrants from entering the interdicting
State), safe third country and country of first asylum determinations48 (also known as "deflection"49 ), the posting of immigration officials in other countries' transit points to identify false
documents or suspicious migrants, and the training and posting
of airline officials at overseas airports and other transit hubs to
screen documents and migrants prior to boarding.5 ' Administrative interception also includes legislative action such as the
creation of "international zones ' 51 or "excised" territories where
more special immigration laws are put into force. Australia's
post-Tampa legislation is one such example, wherein certain territories were legislatively excised from Australia's migration
52

zone.

By contrast, physical interception is more limited and involves interference with vessels, usually in the maritime context,
and may include the boarding, inspection, seizure, and/or destruction of vessels. 53 Physical interception also encompasses activities such as "push-backs," in which boats intercepted in territorial waters may be forcibly "escorted" back out onto the high
seas to prevent disembarkation in the State territory. 54 This Article is specifically concerned with physical interception of maritime vessels, hereafter referred to as "maritime interception."
C. Policy Context of Interception
Interception has proven to be a highly effective tool for controlling migrant flows and because of this it is applied in a variety
of different contexts and in furtherance of an array of different
48. See Stephen Legoisky, Secondar Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers, 15
L. 567 (2003).
49. See James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, FundamentalJustice and the Deflection of Refugees from Canada, 34 OsooDw HiAL L.J. 213 (1996).
50. See A. James Vazquez-Azpiri & Daniel C. Home, The Doorkeeper of Homeland Securiy: Proposalsforthe Visa Waiver Program, 16 STAN. L. & Poi'v Rv. 513, 545-46 (2005);
Audrey Macklin, DisappearingRefugees: Reflections on the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Counto
Agreement, 36 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 365, 368 (2005).
51. See Anmur v France, 19776/92 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1996) (regarding France's
"international zone").
52. Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act, 2001 (Austl.).
53. See UNHCR ExCom, Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, supra note
26,
10.
54. See Robert L. Newmark, Note, Non-rfoulement Run Afoul: The QuestionableLegal
INT'lJ. RFUTG.TE

ityofExtraterritorialRepatriation Programs, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 833, 847 (1993).
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policy goals.5 5 Some of the most common policy justifications
for the use of interception are as a form of law enforcement, as a
means of combating illegal immigration, smuggling or trafficking activity, 56 or as a deterrent against abuse of the asylum system. Interception, it is argued, may deter the irregular movement of refugees who have already secured protection in another country. 57 It is further justified as a national security
measure, or even as an exercise of a State's humanitarian obligations.
Others argue that interception is a deliberate tactic to
avoid or sidestep international refugee obligations . 59' At its most
basic, however, interception is a migration management tool
used to prevent undocumented migrants from crossing international borders."(
D. Protection Gaps in Maritime Interception
At present, States engaged in interception activities do so
either unilaterally, i.e. physically intercepting vessels on the high
seas, or via bilateral or multilateral agreements in which "host"
States may agree to enforce, for example, visa requirements on
behalf of a visa-issuing third country within their own borders.
At present, interception activities are essentially self-regulating,
relying on the goodwill of States to adhere to international
human rights obligations stemming from treaty and customary
norms.
The greatest risk posed by interception at present is the utter lack of any uniform procedural standards governing intercepted persons. Until such uniform standards are adopted, it
will remain a challenge to identify potential refugees and prevent refoulement. States that characterize intercepted persons as
mere "economic migrants" are willfully overlooking possibly
valid refugee claims, thus increasing the likelihood that such
55. See UNHCR, Perspectives from UNHCR and IOM, supra note 3,
2; see also
Legoinsky, The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program, supra note 12.
56. See UNHCR ExCom, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, supra note
26,
3, 14.
57. See id. 15.
58. See id.
16; seealso U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction: Introduction, http://wvww.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/AMIO/AMIO.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2006)
(characterizing interception as "primarily" a "humanitarian responsibility").
59. See Legomsky, supra note 48 at 601 (2003) (describing interception activities as
methods to deny access and barriers to asylum determination systems).
60. See id. at 599.

86

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURAAL

[Vol. 30:75

persons will be returned to the persecuting States from which
they fled.
A systematic method for identifying: 1) the country responsible for the protection of intercepted persons, and 2) the nature of the protection duties, is needed to safeguard such individuals from the risk of refoulement. At present, the UNHCR is
working in partnership with member States (via ExCom), experts and international organizations to attempt to devise such a
system.
II. THE MARITIME DUTY TO RESCUE
A. The Nature of the Legal Obligation
In contrast to the practice of maritime interception, the
duty to rescue those in distress at sea is established by historical
62
humanitarian and legal tradition." It exists under both treaty
and general international law,"3 and applies to both State vessels"4 (military and non-military) as well as private commercial
61. See UNHCR ExCom, Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea, Conclusion No. 23 (XXXII) (Oct. 21, 1981) [hereinafter Conclusion No.
23]; seealso UNHCR ExCom, Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea, Conclusion
No. 38 (XXXVI) (Oct. 18, 1985) [hereinafter Conclusion No. 38]; UNHCR ExCom,
Subcoin. on Int'l Protection ("SCIP"), Problems Related to the Rescue of AsylumSeekers in Distress at Sea, EC/SCP/18 (Aug. 26, 1981) (describing the evolution of the
rescue duty from its first emergence in an international instrument in 1910).
62. The principal maritime treaties that contain rescue obligations include: International Convention on Salvage, Apr. 28, 1989, S. Treat Doc. No. 102-12 (1991), 1953
U.N.T.S. 193 [hereinafter Salvage Convention]; U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (superseding the four
1958 Law of the Sea coinventions: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559
U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311); International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Apr. 27,
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,093, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter SAR]; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, T.I.A.S. 9700, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter SOLAS]. For a thorough oveiview of maritime treaty sources of the rescue obligation, see Migration & International Legal Norms Chapter 8 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Vincent Chetail eds., 2003); seealso Goodwin-Gill, supra note 18.
63. Notwithstanding that it was largely superseded by UNCLOS in 1982, the Preamble to the 1958 Convention on the High Seas states that its provisions are "generally
declaratory of established principles of international law." Convention on the High
Seas, supra note 62, pmbl.; see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAN,
224 n.2 (2003).
64. UNCLOS obligates States Parties to enforce the rescue duty for all ships flying
its flag including both commercial and State vessels. See UNCLOS, supra note 62, art.
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vessels."5 However, despite the broad reach of the rescue obligation,"" the protection that maritime rescue affords is not comprehensive, due to a lack of clarity in the drafting of rescue-related instruments. Until July 2006, a longstanding ambiguity surrounding the disembarkation duty of coastal States has
contributed to a weakening of the rescue regime. Recent maritime treaty amendments to address this problem will be discussed in Part IV.A. of this Article.
Rescue itself has been defined only very recently in the principal search and rescue treaty as "an operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical or other needs,
and deliver them to a place of safety.""' 7 Problematically, this instrument fails to define "a place of safety,""8 but new Guidelines"9 adopted in 2004 attempt to clarify its meaning and will
also be discussed further in Part IV of this Article. This section
will briefly survey the rescue obligations of various actors before
turning to a discussion of the decades-old ambiguity over disembarkation responsibility. It will then discuss recent international
efforts to address these deficiencies, as well as the challenges
that remain.
98(1). The SAR Treaty calls for coordination of search and rescue services using either
designated "rescue units" (public or private) or other (non-rescue) appropriate public
or private services. See SAR, supra note 62, ch. 2.4.1. Similarly, SOLAS requires States
Parties to enforce rescue compliance by all of its shipmasters. See SOLAS, supra note 62.
65. The SOLAS Convention requires States Parties to coordinate and rescue those
in distress off their coasts (Ch. V, Reg 7(1)), and requires shipmasters of merchant
vessels to assist with the rescue of any persons in distress at sea (Ch. V, Reg 33(1)).
Similarly, the Salvage Convention imposes a duty on shipmasters of salvage vessels to
rescue, and obligates States Parties to enforce the rescue duty with regard to commercial vessels, under arts. 10(1), (2). See Salvage Convention, supra note 62. The Salvage
Convention does not apply to warships or any other non-commercial vessels that enjoy
sovereign immunity. See id. art. 4.
66. At the treaty level, rescue obligations extend to coastal States, flag States, and
to shipmasters of commercial or merchant vessels. Coastal States Parties are required to
arrange and coordinate effective search and rescue services, and flag States, coastal or
otherwise, are required to enforce the rescue obligation among shipmasters. Shipmasters therefore have both an indirect duty to rescue, by virtue of flag State enforcement,
and a direct duty tinder certain instruments. See UNCLOS, supra note 62, arts. 98(1)
and (2); see also Salvage Convention, supra note 62, art. 10; SAR, supra note 62, chs. 2-3.
67. See SAR, supra note 62, ch. 1.3.2.
68. Int'l Maritime Org. ("IMO"), Guidelines for the Treatment of Persons Rescued
at Sea, Maritime Safety Comm. ("MSC") Res. 167(78), app.
3, MSC Doc. 78/26/
Add.2, Annex 34 [hereinafter IMO Guidelines] (stating "[t]he SAR Convention does
not define 'a place of safety'").
69. See id.
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Under the Search and Rescue ("SAR") Treaty, search and
rescue services 70 must be established by States Parties and coordinated regionally to be capable of responding to distress signals
in their particular rescue regions. 7 1 As part of this, SAR calls for
the designation of rescue units, which are to participate in
search and rescue functions at sea. 72 Perhaps even more importantly, the rescue regime foresees that, where a designated rescue unit may not be available in the distress area, the relevant
rescue coordinating center may properly designate a non-rescue
vessel, public or private, to respond to the distress call,73 or may
even requisition a private vessel in the vicinity to participate in a
particular rescue operation. 4
B. The DisembarkationProblem

Until 2006, the longstanding weakness of the rescue regime
involved ambiguities concerning the completion of a rescue.
Before the rescue duty was codified in the various instruments
discussed above, the rescue duty involved a routine and established practice of disembarking rescuees at the next port of
call.7 5 Crucially, when the rescue duty was later codified into various international treaties, reference to an explicit disembarka70. A search and rescue service has been defined as: "The performance of distress
monitoring, communication, co-ordination and search and rescue functions, including
provision of medical advice, initial medical assistance, or medical evacuation, through
the use of public and private resources including co-operating aircraft, vessels and
other craft and installations." See SAR, supra note 62, Annex ch. 1.3.3.
71. See id., ch. 2.1.1.

72. See id. ch. 2.4.1. The rescue units themselves may consist of "State or other
appropriate public or private services," including warships, thus indicating that the rescue regime established by this treaty places no public/private restrictions on the nature
of designated rescue vessels. Id. chs. 2.4.1.1, 5.8.1 (referencing "rescue unites (including warships)").
73. See id. ch. 2.4.1.2.
74. See SOLAS, supra note 62, ch. V, reg. 33. This means that regional SAR coordination centers are vested with the authority to coordinate rescue arrangements among
the most appropriate vessels in the rescue area, whether they are merchant vessels,
specialized rescue vessels, or even warships. See SAR, supra note 62, ch.5.8.1. This becomes important in a later discussion of the blurred lines that exist between State-based
rescue and interception. Id.
19-21.
75. See UNHCR ExCom, SCIP, Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers
in Distress at Sea, supra note 61. This practice succeeded for centuries, principally because the vast majority of those rescued at sea could be quickly returned to the protection of their State of origin. Disembarkation was therefore a simple matter in which the
rescued person remained only briefly in the State of disembarkation while their return
was arranged through diplomatic or consular channels.
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tion duty was entirely overlooked; no such corresponding duty
was codified into any rescue instrument.7" According to
UNHCR, the problem stems in part from the fact that disembarkation was "until recently considered so obvious that it was not
found necessary in any of the instruments [pertaining to rescueat-sea] to stipulate an express obligation for the country of the
first port of call to permit the disembarkation of rescued per77
sons."
With the advent of sea-borne refugees, the rescue framework's implied disembarkation practice was turned on its head.
Boat people, unlike those formerly encountered in distress at
sea, did not enjoy the protection of their State, and return to
their State of origin was not a viable option. Disembarkation of
such persons frequently burdened the receiving State with longterm resettlement and protection obligations, creating a strong
disincentive to coastal States to permit further disembarkations.7 ' As coastal States began to refuse disembarkation permission, the problem was transferred to rescuing vessels, creating a
drain on financial and personnel resources for the on-board
care of those rescued, as well as serious interruptions to commercial shipping schedules as vessels moved from port to port, seek79
ing disembarkation permission.
The disembarkation problem reached crisis proportions in
the 1980s when Vietnamese refugees took to the South China
Sea.8 °0 In response, ExCom issued several Conclusions8 ' calling
76. See id. 19.
77. Id. 20.
78. See UNHCR, Background Note, supra note 2,
13, 38, 40.
79. See UNHCR ExComi, SCIP, Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers
in Distress at Sea, EC/SCP/30
2-3 (Sept. 1 1983).
80. See UNHCR, Background Note, supra note 2,
37-38. Many of these so-called
"boat people" became victims of violent attacks by both military elements and pirates at
sea as they sought safe landing. See UNHCR ExCom, Protection of Asylum-Seekers at
Sea, Conclusion No. 20 (XXXI) (Oct. 16, 1980) [hereinafter Conclusion No. 20] (expressing concern about criminal attacks on asylum-seekers at sea in the South China
Sea "involving extreme violence and indescribable acts of physical and moral degradation, including rape, abduction and murder"). Commercial vessels became more reluctant to rescue persons whom no coastal State would allow to disembark, and with this
came a corresponding decline in rescues. See UNHCR ExCom, Problems Related to the
Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in Distress at Sea, Conclusion No. 34 (XXXV), I (a) (Oct. 18,
1984) [hereinafter Conclusion No. 34]; UNHCR ExCom, Rescue of Asylum Seekers in
Distress at Sea, Conclusion No. 31 (XXXIV),
(a) (Oct. 20, 1983) [hereinafter Conclusion No. 31]. Both ExCom Conclusions highlight the decrease in rescues of asylumseekers in distress at sea. Consequently, deaths at sea began to mount. SeeJosh Briggs,
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on States to extend protection and rescue duties to asylum-seekers at sea, and reiterating the "established international practice"2 to permit "next port of call" disembarkation for those rescued at sea.
Eventually, UNHCR initiated resettlement guarantee programs, in which developed States agreed to resettle those individuals in exchange for the coastal States permitting their disembarkation and temporary processing. 3 These programs were
only temporary, however, and were never designed to resolve the
protection gap created by the ambiguity surrounding disembarkation. 4
C. Protection Gaps in the Rescue Context
The disembarkation ambiguity discussed above constitutes a
critical protection gap for refugees rescued at sea 5 by exposing
them to serious risks of harm, ranging from refoulement to violence or mistreatment on board a vessel.8 6 States which do perCom men t, Sur PlacePfugees Status in the Context of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong,
42 AM. U. L. Rrv. 433, 437 (1993).
81. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion 38, supra note 61, (a) ("Reaffirmed the fidamental obligation tinder international law for shipmasters to rescue all persons, including asylumseekers, in distress at sea."); see also UNHCR ExCoin, Conclusion No. 34,
supra note 80; UNHCR, ExCom, Conclusion No. 31, supra note 80; UNHCR ExCom,
Report of the Working Group on Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum-Seekers in
Distress at Sea, Conclusion No. 26 (XXXIII) (Oct. 20, 1982) [hereinafter Conclusion
No. 26]; UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 23, supra note. 61; UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 20, supra note 80; UNHCR ExCom, Refugees Without an Asylum Country,
Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) (Oct. 16, 1979) (referring to a "humanitarian obligation")
[hereinafter Conclusion No. 15].
82. UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 23, supra note 61, 3. For more information
regarding rescue of asylum-seekers in distress at sea, see UNHCR ExCoin, Conclusion
No. 38, supra note 61; UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 34, supra note 80; UNHCR
ExCom, Conclusion No. 31, supra note 80; UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 26, supra
note 81.
83. Two such initiatives were the Rescue at Sea Resettlement Offers ("RASRO")
and the Disembarkation Resettlement Offers ("DISERO") schemes, initiated in response to the Vietnamese boat people crisis of the 1970s. These prograns were later
replaced by the Comprehensive Plan of Action in 1989. See generally UNHCR ExCom,
Conclusion No. 34, supra note 80; Conclusion No. 31, supra note 80; See GuY S. GooDWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 157-59 (2d ed., 1996).
84. See GOODwIN-GIlE,

supra note 83, at 157-60.

85. See generally Richard Barnes, Refugee Law at Sea, 53 INT'L & CoNP. L. Q. 47
(2004) (examining legal obligations existing upon coastal States and flag States in respect of asylum-seekers rescued at sea).
86. This latter scenario involves the possibility of additional harm arising on board,
ranging from lack of access to appropriate medical or basic care, to the risk of being
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mit disembarkation are under no clear obligation to allow entry
or to conduct an initial screening to distinguish those requiring
international protection. 7 Yet another risk is that those in distress will simply be abandoned at sea by vessels unwilling to risk
the costly burden of being unable to disembark those it rescues.
Tragically, there are indications that this trend is on the rise. 8
Beyond the disembarkation ambiguity, another problem
threatens to weaken the rescue regime. As interceptions become a more established practice, there is growing concern that
some interception operations are being characterized as rescue
operations, both in practice 9 and in policy." For example, if a
State military vessel encounters an unseaworthy vessel suspected
of transporting undocumented irregular migrants, should the
encounter properly be characterized as a rescue, or an interception? Similarly, if a vessel suspected of transporting undocumented irregular migrants is encountered in distress, but would
have been intercepted even if it were not in distress, is it a resthrown overboard or otherwise exposed to harmful deterioration of conditions similar
to those seen aboard the MV Tampa off the coast of Australia in 2001.
87. See generally Kathleen Newland, Troubled Waters: Rescue of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees at Sea, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., http://Aw-.migrationinformation.org/featuire/print
.cfn?ID-80 (last visited Jan. 1, 2003).
88. See UNHCR, Summary of Discussions and Recommendations, Expert Meeting
on Interception and Rescue in the Mediterranean, Cooperative Responses, Sept. 12-13,
2005, Athens (citing among the possible consequences of the disembarkation problem
the risk of refusal by shipmasters to respond to distress calls, and the possibility of rescued persons being thrown overboard or encouraged to swim ashore.). In 2005, Vincent Cochetel, Deputy Director of UNHCR's Department of International Protection,
observed that disembarkation refusal could have serious consequences on the rescue
regime itself when he observed that, "[t]he next time (captains) see a ship at sea they
will turn a blind eye, not answer a distress call, or throw (the migrants) overboard." See
Ship Owners Facing "Unfair"Migrant Rescue Butrden, Says UN Refugee Section, UNHCR Nvws
ARCHIVES, Sept. 14, 2005; see also Kehayioylou, supra note 16 (mentioning a rescue by
the Clementine Maersk, after "several other boats either ignored them altogether or
promised to summon help which never materialized").
89. See Brouwer & Kmnin, supra note 5, at 6, 11, 14; see also van Sein & Cooper,
supra note 8, at 5-10 ("If rescue is conducted by state authorities, however, a situation
more similar to that of interception might ensue").
90. UNHCR and ExCom documents contain contradictory notions of rescue and
interception, suggesting on the one hand that rescue "in context of interception" is a
legitimate action, while declaring on the other hand that vessels responding to those in
distress at sea are not engaged in interception. For mention of interception in the
rescue context, see UNHCR, Background Note, supra note 2, 1 9. For mention of rescue in the interception context, see generaly UNHCR ExCom, Interception of AsylumSeekers and Refugees, supra note 26,
16; UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra
note 25.
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cue, or an interception? These issues remain ambiguous, and at
present there are no guidelines dictating how such encounters
should be labeled by State authorities that engage in both interception and rescue operations.
An intercepting State may have incentive to characterize its
actions as one of rescue, particularly if it permits greater interference with a vessel and reduced responsibilities regarding disembarkation and temporary protection of its occupants. Ultimately, this problem highlights the need for greater clarification
of the boundaries, legal limits, and specific circumstances
unique to interception, and of those more intrinsically characteristic of rescue.
In summary, the rescue regime is challenged by both longstanding problems pertaining to disembarkation duties, and an
emerging trend in which maritime interceptions are being characterized as rescue operations. The disembarkation duty has
only recently been addressed by maritime treaty amendments
and the issuance of Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at
Sea. The problem of interception operations co-opting the rescue framework remains to be addressed. Potential resolution of
these protection gaps in rescue will be examined in Section [V.A.
III. OTHER DUTIES AFFECTING REFUGEES AT SEA
Maritime interceptions implicate several intersecting areas
of law,9 ' including international refugee law," international
human rights law,9 3 and maritime law, as well as international
91. See UNHCR ExCom, Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, supra note
20.
92. See, e.g., 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]; See
generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter Refugee Convention].
26,

93. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3;
Convention Against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 14 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture];
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
("CEDAW"), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 172; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
4; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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criminal law. 4 A brief survey of international legal obligations
affecting refugees and asylum seekers at sea reveals a range of
sources from treaty, international legal principles, and custom
affecting States' rights and duties with regard to persons and/or
vessels encountered at sea.
A. The Non-refoulement Obligation in the Refugee Convention
Widely regarded as the cornerstone of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Convention" or the
"Convention"), Article 33 requires that States Parties shall not
"expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
95
would be threatened" on account of a protected ground.
1. Non-Admittance as Refoulement?
There remains persistent disagreement among commentators about the scope of the Article 33 non-refoulement obligation.9" Some scholars have suggested that, whatever its scope at
the time of drafting, the non-refoulement obligation is now regarded as applying at "the moment at which asylum seekers present themselves for entry," so that the principle has progressively
evolved and "now encompasses both non-return and non-rejection" at the frontier. 7 This interpretation of Article 33 as man94. See, e.g., Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25,
U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (Jan. 8, 2001).
95. Refugee Convention, supra note 92, art. 33. This provision applies to recognized refugees as well as asylum seekers who meet the Convention criteria, whether or
not they have been formally processed. The dual application stems from the declaratory nature of refugee status, by which a person is considered to be a refugee as soon as
the refugee criteria have been satisfied, whether or not a formal status determination
has occurred. Because refugees exist as refugees even in the absence of formalized
status determinations, States may not sidestep Ariticle 33 by simply refusing to initiate
status determinations. Id.; see also UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 28, http:// w.unhcr.org/pubil/PUBL/3d58e13b4.pdf
(last visited Nov. 6, 2006); see also GoorowIN-GITI, supra note 83, at 121, 141. Such a
practice would also be contrary to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which precludes a State Party from invoking internal law provisions to disregard its treaty duties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
96. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 83, at 121.
97. See Sir Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement: Opinion, in REFU(EE PROTE(TION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw:
UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATION'S ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 87, 114 (Erika Feller
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dating entry at the State's frontiers has important consequences
in the maritime context, where a coastal State's territorial waters
represent an extension of its territorial boundaries. 8 In effect,
under such an interpretation, refugees arriving by sea who manage to reach a State's territorial waters should not be turned
away. However, such an argument has greater force with regard
to land boundaries, where rejection at one State's border may
inevitably result in refoulement if the neighboring State is the
country of persecution.
By contrast, other commentators argue that because Article
33 "does not affirmatively establish a duty on the part of states to
receive refugees" that "State parties may therefore deny entry to
refugees so long as there is no real chance that their refusal will
result in the return of the refugee to face the risk of being persecuted." 9 It is important to note, however, that this interpretation relies on the qualification that, where rejection at the frontier involves any real risk of harm, "Art[icle] 33 amounts to a de
facto duty to admit the refugee, since admission is normally the
only means of avoiding the alternative, impermissible consequence of exposure to risk."'1t Under this reading, Article 33 is
not violated where refugees are rejected at the border, unless
such rejection involves any real risk of return. 10 1 In the rescueat-sea context, coastal State refusal of disembarkation would result in an unknown final destination-something that, depending on the proximity of the persecuting State to later disembarkation points, could qualify as an "impermissible ... exposure to
risk." 102
Ultimately, whether one subscribes to the notion that nonet a]. eds., 2003) [hereinafter REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW~] (espousing
the view that Article 33 extends to rejection at the frontier); see also GOOILWIN-GILL,
supra note 83, at 123-24 (arguing that, while non-refoulement did not encompass nonrejection at the frontier in 1951, State practice has contributed to progressive development of the law and has led to the establishment of a broader interpretation of the
concept).
98. See UNCLOS, supra note 62, arts. 2(1), 2(3) (establishing that the "sovereignty
of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory . . . to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea" and noting that "sovereignty over the territorial sea is
exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law," respectively).
99. HATHAXWAY, supra note 34, at 301 (citations omitted).
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
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refoulement requires admission or can permit the denial of entry
at the frontier, the two schools of opinion appear to converge at
the point where refusal at the border could mean a return to
harm, either directly or indirectly. 3 In cases where such a
threat exists, the non-refoulement obligation does not permit rejection at the frontier.1

4

2. Extraterritorial Effect of Article 33
The debate as to the extraterritorial scope of Article 33 is
also pronounced. The majority view characterizes Article 33 as
having full extraterritorial effect, based on the plain language of
the provision, and the object and purpose of the Convention itself, which would be rendered meaningless if States could sidestep legal safeguards by moving their actions outside of their territory.' 1 5 Another argument in support of this interpretation involves a comparative analysis of other international human
rights instruments in order to draw parallels to the Refugee Convention. 10 6 Notoriously, the interpretation that Article 33 applies extraterritorially was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court
when it held in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council that the U.S. Coast
Guard's high seas interception and return of Haitian asylum
seekers did not contravene Article 33 or its domestic counterpart, because "return" in the context of "refoulement" did not
encompass actions taken on the high seas, beyond the U.S. territorial frontier." 7 Despite a stinging dissent by Justice Blackmun
and widespread criticism by scholars and commentators, the
United States continues to adhere to the position that Article 33
103. See HATHAVAY, supra note 34, at 301; Lauterpacht et al., supra note 97, at 11314. But see David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The Principleof Non-Rcfoulement: Article
3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Creet, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International Human
Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. Hum. RTS. L. Rv. 1, 11 (1999).
104. See HATHAWAY, supta note 34, at 301. But see Lauterpacht et al., supta note 97,
at 113-14 (suggesting an alternative to admission to the State's territory); see also Weissbrodt et al., supta note 103, at 11 (discussing Article 33 exceptions preventing a person
from obtaining refugee status).
105. The plain language of Aiticle 33 explicitly bans refoulement "in any nanner
whatsoever," and the view that the provision has extraterritorial effect has been supported by the UNHCR in a variety of contexts, including an amicus curiae brief to the
U.S. Supreine Court in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 113 S.Ct. 2549
(1993).
106. See Lauterpacht et al., supra note 97, at 87-164.
107. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 182-83.
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of the Refugee Convention has no extraterritorial effect, and
does not therefore constrain actions taken beyond its own territorial frontiers such as the high seas."' The U.S. position has
been soundly rejected by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, which concluded simply that "Article 33 ha[s] no
geographical limitations. ""' The U.S. view therefore appears to
constitute a minority position, although its actions remain nonetheless influential on the world scene, and some have argued
that the Sale case helped to shape Australia's response to the MV
Tampa incident.1 1 0
A more nuanced position in support of extraterritorial effect of Article 33 is advocated by ProfessorJames C. Hathaway."'
According to Professor Hathaway, refugees are entitled to a
range of rights, the nature and extent of which depend on the
level of a refugee's level of attachment to the asylum State. 112
He argues that Article 33 is among "a small number of core
rights" that apply to asylum-seekers regardless of their "level of
attachment" to a State territory, so that certain rights and protections inhere even before a refugee reaches a particular State,
where a refugee is merely subject to a State's jurisdiction." 3
Drawing on both the text of the Convention and general principles of public international law, he concludes that, "the governments of state parties are bound to honor these rights not only
in territory over which they have formal, dejure jurisdiction, but
equally in places where they exercise effective or de facto jurisdiction outside their own territory.""' 4 This would include situations "in which a state's consular or other agents take control of
persons abroad,"' 1 5 such as the high seas. This Article thus
adopts the position that the geographic scope of Article 33,
while still debated, is likely to extend beyond State territory to
encompass State exercises of effective or de facto jurisdiction.
108. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v.Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425-26 (11th Cir.
1995). See generally Sale, 509 U.S. at 154-92; Aerolineas Argentinas v.U.S., 77 F.3d 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Rodriguez v.Ridge, 310 F.Supp. 2d 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
109. Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Report No.
51/96, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/11.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 550,
157 (1997).
110. See Morris, supta note 23, at 51.
111. See generally HATHAXWAY, supta note 34, at 160.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 304.
114. Id. at 169.
115. Id. at 170.
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B. The Non-refoulement Obligation in Other Legal Sources
In the last half-century, the non-refoulement obligation has
emerged in other international instruments, including the Convention Against Torture ("CAT")"6 and various regional treaties," 7 although the latter sources are beyond the scope of this
Article and will not be surveyed here. Still other treaty provisions have been interpreted so as to include an implied nonrefoulement obligation, such as Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR" or "Covenant") "
which will be discussed below, as well as various regional treaties" ' which are beyond the scope of this Article. Additionally,
there is also support for the notion that non-refoulement has be120
come an established principle of customary international law,
although scholarly debate continues on this issue.
1. Convention Against Torture
The CAT contains an express non-refoulement provision,
which states: "No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." 12 1 In terms of its geographic scope, some
have argued that the textual similarity between the CAT and Ref-

ugee Convention provisions could render the CAT provision
equally vulnerable to an interpretation, extended from the U.S.
Supreme Court in the Sale case, of having merely territorial effect. 1 22 Although Article 3 makes no mention of extraterritorial
116. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 93, art. 3(1).
117. See, e.g., Organization of American States ("OAS"), American Convention on
Human Rights art. 22(8), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]; Organization of African Unity ("OAU"), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees Problems in Africa art. 2(3), Sept. 10, 1969,
1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 8 I.L.M. 1288.
118. ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 7.
119. Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms has been interpreted as including a non-reoulement element as well. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
120. See Summay Conclusions: The Principle of Non-Refoulement, in REFU(,E PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GiOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION 178, [ 1 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003).
121. Convention Against Torture, supra note 93, art. 3(1).
122. See John C. Yoo, Transfeing Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1183, 1229
(2004). See generally Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
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application, Article 2 nonetheless requires States to take all measures to prevent acts of torture and applies it "in any territory
under [a State's] jurisdiction," a provision broad enough to possibly subsume the scope of returns under Article

323

The Com-

mittee Against Torture recently reiterated that this latter provision should be interpreted to include "all areas under the de
facto effective control of the State party," and should be considered to extend the rights under CAT to "all persons under the
effective control of its authorities. "124 Moreover, the Committee
Against Torture found that, in the case of the United States, any
attempt to construe Article 3 as not applying extraterritorially
was erroneous. 2 5 Thus, CAT's Article 3 non-refoulement provision
should be construed as having extraterritorial effect.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The Covenant contains no express non-refoulement duty. It
does, however, contain a torture ban provision under Article 7126
that has been construed by its treaty body, the U.N. Human
Rights Committee ("UNHCR"), as encompassing such a duty. In
a General Comment, the Committee declared that States must
not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country "by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulemengt."

1

27

The scope of the Covenant's legal obligations are outlined
in Article 2, which requires States Parties to respect the rights of
those "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.' 12 The
UNHRC has interpreted this provision to extend Covenant
rights to persons either within its territory or subject to its juris123. Convention Against Torture, supra note 93, art. 2.
124. Conclusions and recomnendations of the Committee against Torture,
United States ofAmerica, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/C/2, 15 (2006).
125. Id. at 20.
126. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 93, art. 7 ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experiinentation.").
127. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20: Article 7, reprinted in
Compilation of General Requirements and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 30,
9, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/ I /Rev.1 (1994).
128. ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 2(1).
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diction. 129
It can thus be concluded from language of the Covenant
itself and the General Comments of the UNHRC that Article 7
includes a non-refoulement obligation, and that obligation applies
where the State exerts power or effective control over individuals, even if such individuals are outside the State Party's territory.
3. Customary International Law
One final embodiment of the non-refoulement obligation is
as a principle of customary international law. There is not yet
consensus as to whether the principle has been incorporated
into a custom."" During the last two decades, some scholars
have continued to express cautious reservation on this issue,131
while others have strongly refuted that it has achieved such status. 1 32 In recent years, however, the weight of scholarly opinion
appears to favor the view of non-refoulement as an established
principle of customary law,' 33 which thereby requires compliance even by States that are not a party to the Refugee Convention, the CAT, or the ICCPR. Still others have suggested that the
129. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Obligation oil States Parties to the Covenant
10, U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.13 (2004).
This means that a State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in
the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State
Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party. This principle
also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a
State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which
such power or effective control was obtained. Id.
130. See Lauterpacht et al., supra note 97, at 140-64; see also Guy S. Goodwvin-Gill,
Non-refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, in INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAWX: A READER
109-10 (B.S. Chimni ed., 2000) (proposing that the core meaning of Article 33 had
been incorporated into customary international law and that it also extended to persons outside the Refugee Convention definition). But see GoolwIN-Giii, supra note 83,
at 134-37 (noting that both Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the
Colnvention Against Torture are of a fundamentally norm-creating character regarded
as forming the basis of a general rule of law as described by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ") in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, but observing
nonetheless that "establishing the status of the principle in general on customary international law presents greater problems").
131. See Lauterpacht et al., supra note 97, at 140-64; seealso Goodwin-Gill, Nonrefoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, supra note 130, at 109-10.
132. See HATHAWAY, supra note 34, at 363.
133. See Lauterpacht et al., supra note 97, at 140-64; seealso Goodwin-Gill, supra
note 130.
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principle of non-refoulement may be of a peremptory norm," 4 but
this Article declines to take a position on what appears to be an
evolving issue.
The combined breadth of coverage provided by these instruments and principles is significant. The scope, application,
and possible limitations of the non-refoulement duty may differ
according to its source under law, but the general nature of the
prohibition can be said to require widespread compliance by
States Parties to the Refugee Convention, CAT, and the ICCPR,
and may be broadly characterized as extending extraterritorially
to actions in which power or effective control over persons is
jurisdictionally exercised by the State.
C. State Rights and Duties at Sea
The maritime context involves different sets of rights and
duties depending on the particular zone in which activity occurs. 1

5

A brief overview of the maritime zones and correspond-

ing international obligations relevant to rescue and interception
follows. The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS") 1 36 identifies and defines the scope of the boundaries,
legal rights and duties pertinent to each maritime zone.
1. Territorial Sea
The territorial sea extends twelve nautical miles from the
low water mark of a State's coastline 13 7 and represents the zone
in which States have the greatest exercise of sovereignty at sea. 3 '
Notwithstanding this, sovereignty in a State's territorial sea is not
as complete as it would be in its land-based territories.'-" Rather,
134. See Jean Allain, TheJus Cogens Nature of Non-refoulement, 13 INT'lJ. RrFUTGEE L.
533, 533-58 (2001) (citing, among other justifications, the established status of nonrefoulement under customary international law; ExCom conclusions reflecting consensus
of States Parties; the 1984 Cartagena Declaration; and assertions of scholar Harold
Koh).
135. See generally Karen M. Hansenand et al., Trends in Commercial Development of
Ocean Resources, 14(5) METROPOIITAN CORP. COUNS. 21 (May 2006).
136. The UNCLOS supersedes the four 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions. See supra
note 62.
137. See UNCLOS, supra note 62, art. 3.
138. See id. art. 2(1) ("The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land
territory ... to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea."); see also id. art.
2(3) ("The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention
and to other rules of international law.").
139. See BROWNLL, supra note 63, at 186 ("In practical terms, the coastal state has
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States' exercise of sovereignty in their territorial sea is limited by
UNCLOS provisions, such as the right of innocent passage, and
by "other rules of international law."'' "" Potentially included
among such "other rules" are the maritime rescue duty, the non42
refoulement duty, 14 ' and Article 31 of the Refugee Convention,
each of which must be balanced against the State's right to act
within this zone.
a. The Right of Innocent Passage
The most significant limitation on a State's exercise of sovereignty in the territorial sea is that of the right of innocent passage.' 43 This right is extended to all vessels, whether merchant
ships or government ships operated for either commercial or
non-commercial purposes (including warships)."' Innocent
passage generally permits "continuous and expeditious" crossing
by one flag State vessel through the territorial sea of another
State, but may also include stopping and anchoring as necessary
for navigation, distress situations, or rescue. 14 5 However, passage
involving the "loading or unloading of any commodity, currency
or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations of the coastal State"' 46 is not innocent, and
therefore gives the coastal State the authority to "take the necessary steps in its territorial sea"'1 47 to bar such passage.
b. Other Limits on State Sovereignty in Territorial Waters
Several ambiguities arise in the context of innocent passage.
rights and duties inherent in sovereignty, although foreign vessels have privileges, associated particularly with the right of innocent passage, which have no counterparts in
respect of the land domain apart from special agreement or customary rights.").
140. UNCLOS, supra note 62, art. 2(3) ("The sovereignty over the territorial sea is
exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law.").
141. See generally Refugee Convention, supra note 92; see generally Convention
Against Torture, supra note 93; seegenerally ICCPR, supra note 93.
142. See Refugee Convention, supra note 92.
143. The right of innocent passage is recognized under treaty, in UNCLOS, and as
customary law. See UNCLOS, supra note 62, arts. 17-19. For a discussion of the right of
innocent passage as customary law, see BROwNNIi, supra note. 63, at 186-91.
144. UNCLOS, Section 3, Subsection A is entitled "Rules Applicable to All Ships"
and includes Articles 17-26, which define the right and meaning of innocent passage.
See UNCLOS, supra note 62, art. 17 ("[S]hips of all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.").
145. Id. art. 18(2).
146. Id. art. 19(2)(g) (emphases added).
147. Id. art. 25(1).
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For example, what happens when the UNCLOS rules governing
innocent passage conflict with "other rules of international law,"
such as the Refugee Convention non-refoulement obligation, or
the rescue duty? How do the rules governing innocent passage
operate in rescue or interception scenarios? If a vessel enters a
State's territorial waters in distress from having undertaken a rescue, does the vessel's distress situation trump the State's exercise
of immigration jurisdiction? In this situation, drawing parallels
to the Australian Tampa scenario, 48 such a vessel should be permitted to remain within the territorial waters for purposes of
stopping and anchoring, although a corresponding right of disembarkation remains elusive.
Recently, guidelines issued by the International Maritime
Organization ("IMO") have acknowledged this ambiguity and
suggest that an obligation may exist under customary international law to allow a vessel in distress to come to port. 49 The
Guidelines suggest that the right is not absolute, however, and an
assessment would involve:
[A] balancing of the nature and immediacy of the threat to
the ship's safety against the risks to the port that such entry
may pose. Thus, a coastal State might refuse access to its
ports where the ship poses a serious and unacceptable safety,
environmental, health or security threat to that coastal State
after the safety of persons onboard is assured.'150
Under such a reading, it appears that a State's general immigration laws are insufficient to justify refusal of access to port for a
vessel in distress where its occupants pose no serious threat to
that State.'' Unfortunately, in the present climate of securitized
148. In 2001, the Norwegian cargo ship, the MV Tampa, ended up sending a distress signal to the Australian government after taking on board more than 400 rescuees;
the vessel was designed for a crew of only fifty. For more detail on the Tampa situation,
see generally Chantal Marie-Jeanne Bostock, The Intetrnational Legal Obligations Owed to
the Atylum Seekers on the MV Tampa, 14 INT'L.J. RVFUGEE L. 279 (Apr. 2002); Jessica Howard, To Deter and Deny: Australia and the Interdiction of Asylum Seekers, 21 (4) RLTUGE 35
(2003); Tara Magner, A Less Than "Pacific" Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia, 16
INT'l J. REFUGEE L. 53 (2004); Morris, supra note 23.
149. "UNCLOS does not specifically address the question of whether there exists a
right to enter a port in cases of distress, although tinder customary international law,
there may be a universal, albeit not absolute, right for a ship in distress to enter a port
or harbour when there exists a clear threat to safety of persons aboard the ship." IMO

Guidelines, supra note 68, annex 34, § 1.1.
150. Id. annex 34, app. 1 6.
151. See id.
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migration control, migration policies may be more driven by na52
tional security concerns than by technical immigration rules.'
The territorial sea also implicates Article 31 of the Refugee
Convention, which precludes a State from imposing penalties
upon refugees who, "on account of their illegal entry or presence," "enter or are present in [the] territory without authorization."'1 53 Refugees on a vessel within a State's territorial sea are

technically already "present in the territory" and are therefore
subject to protection from penalties for their illegal entry. Article 31 should therefore constitute one of the "other rules of international law" that can trump a State's exercise of sovereignty
154
in its own territorial sea.

2. Contiguous Zone

55

Immigration control is cited as a permitted activity within
the contiguous zone, although it has been argued that the jurisdictional rights available in the contiguous zone "do not clearly
include the interception of vessels believed to be carrying asylum-seekers," premised on the notion that only those powers
permitted under international law may be exercised in the contiguous zone.' 15 However, this assertion pre-dated the entry into
force of the Smuggling Protocol, which has since explicitly recognized a State right of interception in the anti-smuggling con152. See generally Michael Pugh, Drowning not Waving: Boat People and Humanitarianism at Sea, 17J. REFUGEE STUD. 50 (2004) (discussing the conflict of humanitarian refugee regimes and perceived threat of refugees).
153. See Refugee Convention, supra note 92, art. 31.
154. See generally IMO Guidelines, supra note 68.
155. Extending another twelve miles from the outer limits of the territorial sea,
contiguous zones exist as specialized zones of State jurisdiction, but do not afford States
the sovereignty of the territorial sea. A contiguous zone may be designated for limited
purposes: to prevent or punish "infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea." See UNCLOS, supra
note 62, art. 33(1). The concept of contiguous zones has been described as areas in
which jurisdiction is given to States, for particular purposes, over the high seas. See
BROWNLLE, supra note 63, at 192. Such language was present in Article 24 of the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea, but was removed in Article 33 in UNCLOS 1982,
which largely superseded the earlier instrument. See UNCLOS, supra note 62, art. 33.
Because the contiguous zones are zones of special jurisdiction within the high seas, "the
rights of the coastal state in such a zone do not amount to sovereignty, and thus other
states have rights exercisable over the high seas except as they are qualified by the
existence ofjurisdictional zones." See BRO-WNir, supra note 63, at 192.
156. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 83, at 165.
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so the observation may no longer hold sway.' 58

3. Freedom of High Seas and the Right of

Visitl

51

The freedom of the high seas has been described as a general principle of international law,"O and many of the specific
rules supporting this broad concept have been provided by
treaty in order to promote the freedom of navigation. On the
high seas, all ships are under the exclusive jurisdiction of their
flag State, 6 1 and each flag State has a corresponding duty to exercise jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag.'" 2 As
such, no State may exercise jurisdiction over another State's vessel except in very limited circumstances, such as a right of "visit"
63
or a right of hot pursuit.'
164
a. Right of Visit

It is essentially a right of visit that is being exercised in the
context of maritime interceptions. Attempts by some States to
expand the right of visit to include a national security justification have been for the most part rejected as inappropriate due
to the potential for abuse and manipulation,' 1 5 although this
view may be changing as anti-terrorism tactics aggressively evolve
157. See Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants, supra note 4, art. 8.
158. See generally IMO Guidelines, supra note 68.
159. Beyond the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone lie the high
seas, where all States enjoy the freedom of navigation, and upon which no State may
exert its sovereignty. See UNCLOS, supra note 62, arts. 87, 89. Essentially, "[t]he
freedom of the high seas does not mean that a state can simply take any action it pleases
against other vessels." Mark Pallis, Obligations of States towards Asylum Seekers at Sea:
Interactions and Conflicts Between Legal Regimes, 14 INT'L J. RLFUGEE L. 329, 350 (2002).
160. See BROWNIF, supra note 63, at 225.

161. UNCLOS, supra note 62, art. 92.
162. See id. art. 94.
163. Under UNCLOS, the right of hot pursuit exists where there is "good reason
to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State," although this
provision is unlikely to permit push-backs in the refugee context. UNCLOS, supra note
62, art. 111.
164. The right of visit allows a State military vessel to interfere with a foreign vessel
by verifying its right to fly its flag, or by boarding, inspection, or even seizure. Because
of the significance of the interference, it is permitted only under strictly enumerated
circumstances. Interferences with a foreign flagged vessel are only permitted where
there is: reasonable suspicion of slavery, piracy, unauthorized broadcasting; a flagless
ship; or where suspicion exists that a foreign-flagged ship is, in reality, of the same flag
as the inspecting vessel. See UNCLOS, supra note 62, art. 110.
165. See BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 234-35.
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in the post-September 11 era.'" Of the circumstances permitting a right of visit, the ground most likely to justify interception
(or most likely to arise in that context) involves flagless vessels.
The ability of States to intercept flagless vessels (or vessels of
questionable flag origin) is of particular relevance in the refugee
context, because such vessels are likely to be relied upon by asylum seekers, their smugglers, or traffickers.' 67 Despite the ability
of non-flag States to exercise control over such a vessel, State
exercises of jurisdiction are restricted by UNCLOS itself (and its
rules on the right of visit) and also by "other rules of international law,"'"8 including the principle of non-refoulement and the
rescue duty." 9
4. Duties and Rights with Regard to Smuggled Migrants
With the entry into force of the Protocol Against Smuggling, 7 " maritime interception was implicitly acknowledged as a
legitimate tool for border control and enforcement.' 7 ' Article 8
of the Protocol allows the search, boarding, and seizure of persons and cargo where there are reasonable grounds to suspect
that the vessel is engaged in smuggling. 7 2 In this instrument,
interception is contemplated in a more cooperative context,
where flag States may grant authorization to foreign-flagged
166. See generally UNCLOS, Hearing Before the Committee on IntetrnationalRelations,
108th Cong. 18 (2004) (statement of Sen. Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Foreign Rel.).
167. See GOOIMWIN-GIL, supra note 83, at 161. Quite problematically, such vessels
are also the most likely to be unseaworthy, vulnerable to distress, and prone to requiring rescue. This intersection of grounds for justifying both interception and rescue
highlights the need for greater clarification of these two practices by more clearly defining and delineating the scope of each, and will be discussed more thoroughly in Section
IV.B.
168. See UNCLOS, supra note 62, art. 87(1).
169. See GooDWIN-GILL, supra note 83, at 162; see also Pallis, supra note 7.
170. See Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supra
note 4.
171. See id. art. 2.
172. The Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air permits a State vessel to act with regard to vessels suspected of being of the same nationality
as the State vessel by requesting assistance from other flag State vessels to suppress the
use of the vessel for that purpose. The Protocol also permits boarding, search, and
"appropriate. measures.., as authorized by the flag State." where the suspected vessel is
under the jurisdiction of another State, and that State has given authorization for
search and boarding; and boarding and search where the suspected vessel is without
nationality, "inaccordance with relevant domestic and international law." Id. arts. 8(1),
8(2), 8(7).
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State vessels in order to facilitate interception of suspected smuggling vessels. 1 73 This provision effectively dispenses with the concept of exclusive flag State jurisdiction by creating an interception-sharing scheme where authorized by the flag State. These
provisions are exclusive to the maritime context of the Protocol,
and include particular safeguards that include obligations to
"ensure the safety and humane treatment of persons on board"
74
and "not to endanger the security of the vessel or its cargo."'
Additional protection for those found aboard smuggling
vessels is provided by a savings clause' 7 5- preventing any Protocol
provisions from infringing upon rights guaranteed under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, the
Refugee Convention, "and the principle of non-refoulement as
contained therein."'' 7 ' This is an important provision given the
growing recognition that refugees, with increasing prevalence,
are now resorting to smuggling as a means of escaping persecution and reaching safer territory.17 7 These provisions require
corresponding guidelines to safeguard the rights of intercepted
persons in need of international protection vis A vis the intercepting State.
IV. ADDRESSING THE PROTECTION GAPS
A. Improved Safeguards in the Rescue Regime
Efforts aimed at improving safeguards in the rescue context
have been both considerable and promising. This section traces
the evolving response by the international community since
2002 to address the disembarkation issue which emerged prima173. See id. art. 8(4).
174. Id. arts. 9(a), 9(b).
175. A similar savings clause is also present in the Trafficking Protocol. See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supra note 4.
176. See Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supra
note 4, art. 19(1).
177. Erika Feller, The Evolution of the InternationalRef ugee ProtectionRegme, 5 WAsH.
U.J.L & Poi ' 129, 135 (2001) ("Increasingly, asylum seekers have opted for what has
become an important option; being smuggled to sanctuary."); see also Amnesty Int'l
Austl., People Smuggling-Fact Sheet, http://www.amnesty.org.au/resources/fact
sheets/people-smuggling - fact sheet (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) ("There is now growing consensus that the restrictive asylun practices introduced by many of the industrialized states have converted what was a relatively visible and quantifiable flow of asylum
seekers into a covert, irregular movement that is even more difficult for states to control.").
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rily from a roundtable discussion begun in 2002.178 It focuses in
particular on a series of maritime treaty amendments and a set
of accompanying guidelines that entered into force in July 2006.
In 2002, UNHCR revived discussions on the issue of protection for asylum seekers and refugees rescued at sea. In a 2002
Background Note, UNHCR confirmed the "lack of clarity" in
maritime law with regard to disembarkation,17 9 revived its call
for prompt disembarkation at the next port of call,18 1 and recommended that screenings for refugees be performed on dry land
rather than on board a vessel, reasoning that prompt disembarkation would be more likely to lead to timely screenings, processing, and protection access.' 8 '
At the Expert Roundtable in Lisbon later in 2002, the "next
port of call" recommendation was discarded and replaced with a
recommendation to increase shipmasters' discretion in determining the time and place for disembarkation,1 2 although ultimately no firm rule was recommended. Instead of adopting
forceful language to encourage the establishment of a new practice, the Roundtable merely observed shipmasters' "right to expect the assistance of coastal States," and called upon coastal
8
States to provide assistance where requested by rescue vessels.1 1
Absent were any criteria to determine the State or States responsible for disembarkation, screening, access to asylum procedures, temporary protection and resettlement. Ultimately, the
Roundtable conclusions failed to definitively resolve the disembarkation issue, although the suggestion to respect shipmasters'
184
discretion created a potential starting point.
178. See UNHCR, Expert Roundtable on Rescue-at-sea, Lisbon, Port., Mar. 25-26,
2002, Specific Aspects Relating to the Protection of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees:
Summary of Discussions
1 [hereinafter Summary of Discussions].
179. UNHCR, Background Note., supra note 2,
11.
180. This term was viewed as encompassing a variety of concepts, including the
nearest port, the port of embarkation, the next scheduled port of call, or the bestequipped port of call. The "next port of call" recommendation was based upon a nunber of factors, including: (1) the narrow scope and limits of shipmasters' rescue duty;
(2) the need to ensure continued success of the rescue regime by promoting swift and
predictable responses by all parties; and (3) the need to guarantee the safety of the
rescuing vessel and those aboard. See UNHCR, Summary of Discussions, supra note. 178,

10.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See id.
14.
See id.
6-8.
Id. 6.
See id. 5.
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A much more tangible and promising consequence of the
18 5
Roundtable resulted from its follow-up efforts with the IMO.
As the U.N. agency primarily responsible for issues of maritime
safety, the IMO is the drafting and amending body for the SAR
and the Safety of Life at Sea Convention ("SOLAS"),18 6 the latter
instrument being the principal international treaty concerned
with the safety of merchant ships. One of the follow-up goals of
the 2002 Lisbon Roundtable was to encourage the IMO to address "any inadequacies in the law"'1 7-a pointed reference to
the drafting inadequacies of the treaty instruments pertaining to
rescue.
In May 2004, the IMO adopted amendments to both the
SOLAS t8 8 and SAR t8 9 Conventions, and created a set of Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea,' t9 that addressed,
among others, the disembarkation issue. The two sets of amendments entered into force onJuly 1, 2006,'l and contain a nearly
identical provision for identifying the coastal State responsible
for disembarkation:
[Parties] shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters of ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released from their obligations with minimum
further deviation from the ships' intended voyage, provided
that releasing the master of the ship from [these obligations]
does not further endanger the safety of life at sea. [Theparty]
responsiblefor the search and rescue region in which such assistance
is rendered shall exercise primary responsibilityfor ensuring such coordinationand co-operation occurs, so that survivors assisted are disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety,

taking into account the particular circumstances of the case
and guidelines developed by the Organization. In these
185. See generally IMO Website, wwx.imno.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
186. See SAR, supra note 62, art. III; SOLAS, supra note 62, art. VIII.
187. See UNHCR, Summary of Discussions, supra note 178,
16.
188. See IMO, Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, MSC Res. 153(78), MSC Doc. 78/26.Add.1, Annex 3 (May 20, 2004) [hereinafter SOLAS Amendments].
189. See IMO, Adoption of Amendinents to the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, as amended, Res. MSC 155(78), MSC Doc. 78/26.add.1,
Annex 5 (May 20, 2004) [hereinafter SAR Amendments].
190. See IMO Guidelines, supra note 68.
191. Under the terms of SOLAS and SAR, amendments are deemed to have been
accepted unless more than one third of Parties object to the amendments. See SOLAS,
supra note 62, art. VIII(b) (vi) (2) (bb); see also SAR, supra note 62, art. 111(2) (f).
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cases, the relevant [parties] shall arrangefor9such
disembarkation to
2
be effected as soon as reasonably practicable.'
Interestingly, the IMO amendments reflect neither the
UNHCR Background Note recommendation to vest the disembarkation duty with the "next port of call" State, nor the mud-

dled Roundtable approach to merely respect shipmasters' discretion as to where disembarkation should occur.'9-3 Instead, primary authority for disembarkation decisions lies (since July 1,
2006) with the State responsible for search and rescue in the
region where the rescue occurs. 4 What this means in practical
terms is that the Rescue Co-ordination Centres ("RCCs") 1 95 may
now designate where disembarkation will occur on behalf of the
assisting vessel, regardless of the status of that vessel as private or
State-owned, military or non-military.'
It remains to be seen how this new disembarkation scheme
will affect rescue in practice. In theory, vesting the disembarkation decision with the State responsible for the rescue coordination represents a practical solution, while potentially involving
prospective risks in actual implementation. 9 7 Perhaps even
192. See SOLAS Amendments, supra note 188, Reg. 33-1-1 (emphasis added); see
also SAR Amendments, supra note 189, 3.1.9 (emphasis added). The bracketed terms
reflect the actual language of the SOLAS amendment; under the SAR amendment the
term "Contracting Governments" replaces "Party/Parties" and the expression "the obligations tinder the current regulation" replaces the expression "these obligations" used
in the SOLAS amendment.
193. New regulation 34-1 of the SOLAS Convention, however, supplemented the
disembarkation provision with another governing the issue of shipmasters' discretion. IMO, Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of
Lofe at Sea, 1974, Res. 153(78), MSC Doc. 78/26/Add.I, Annex 3. New regulation 34-1
notes that a shipmaster's professional judgment as to decisions necessary for safety of
life at sea should not be interfered with by a ship owner, charterer, or company operator. Id.
194. See SAR Amendments, supra note 189,
3.1.9.
195. See SAR, supra note 62, Annex Ch. 1.3.5 (Defining a Rescue Co-ordination
Centre ("RCC") as a "unit responsible for promoting efficient organization of search
and rescue services and for co-ordinating the conduct of search and rescue operations
within a search and rescue region").
196. See id. 4.8.5 ("The rescue co-ordination centre or rescue sub-centre concerned shall initiate the process of identifying the most appropriate place(s) for disembarking persons found in distress at sea. It shall inforn the ship or ships and other
relevant parties concerned thereof.").
197. First, the RCC responsible for the rescue may find itself under pressure from
other government departments not to designate its own State as the place of disembarkation, and to "dump" the disembarkation responsibility on neighboring coastal States,
creating the potential for the framework to fail for lack of political will. The second
and related concern is the likelihood that the RCC's will become highly politicized
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more consequential than the amendments are the accompanying Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea. This instrument is designed to "provide guidance to [States Parties to
SAR and/or SOLASI and to shipmasters with regard to humanitarian obligations and obligations under the relevant international law relating to treatment of persons rescued at sea."'9 8 It
attempts to address many important issues that are conspicuously missing from the maritime treaty amendments, including,
' 99
for example, clarification of the meaning of "place of safety.
The Guidelines do not attempt to provide a singular definition of the concept of "place of safety," but they do give insight
into its meaning. For example, a place of safety is "a location
where rescue operations are considered to terminate," and from
which survivors' safety and basic human needs can be met. 2®° It
can also be a very temporary transit point, however, since it is
also "a place from which transportation arrangements can be
made for the survivors' next or final destination.""' Moreover, a
place of safety may not even necessarily be on dry land; it "may
be aboard a rescue unit or other suitable vessel or facility at sea
that can serve as a place of safety until the survivors are disembarked to their next destination. "202 This poses an immediate problem of robbing the new amendments of any meaningful
improvements, since they require that survivors be "disembarked
from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety." If disembarkation from one ship can simply mean delivery to another
vessel, then clearly the disembarkation problem has not been
solved. It is thus clear that a place of safety is a much narrower
and more limited concept than that of disembarkation, and that
the potential for survivors to languish on board a vessel remains
a risk.
The Guidelines also discuss the potential conflict between
State organs, perhaps infused with delegated duties to assess refugee status and powers
to grant or deny humanitarian protections. At present, RCCs have a limited scope of
authority and expertise pertaining only to rescue, and a politicization of the role of the
RCC would likely weaken the rescue regime by injecting non-rescue-related considerations into the disembarkation decision. See IMO Guidelines, supra note 68, at 6.4; see
also SAR, supra note 62, Annex Ch. 2.3.
198. See IMO Guidelines, supra note 68,
1.1.
199. See id.
6.12-6.18, app. 3.
200. See id. 6.12.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 6.14.
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the need to promptly disembark rescued persons and States'
non-rescue-related interests in screening such individuals before
permitting disembarkation. On this matter, the Guidelines are
clear that delivery to a place of safety should take precedence
over any non-SAR concerns, and that these should not delay disembarkation:
Any operations and procedures such as screening and status
assessment of rescued persons that go beyond rendering assistance to persons in distress should not be allowed to hinder
the provision of such assistance or unduly delay
disembarka2 3
tion of survivors from the assisting ship(s). 0
This paragraph suggests that concern over a rescued individual's

refugee status may not be used as grounds for delaying disembarkation. It also implies that the State of disembarkation retains responsibility for screening of rescued persons, since any
State concerns over status assessment must necessarily follow disembarkation. In this sense, it suggests that responsibility for
screening (to identify rescued persons in need of international
protection) lies with the State of disembarkation.
The SAR and SOLAS amendments offer promising new
changes to the rescue instruments by finally making the disembarkation duty the explicit responsibility of the RCCs. The accompanying Guidelines offer new insight into the meaning of
"place of safety" and permissible bases for delaying disembarkation of rescued persons. One problem with the Guidelines, however, is its legal status as a non-binding instrument.
B. Interception "Cloaked" as Rescue
Finally, a serious concern among experts and States is the
growing trend of characterizing interceptions as rescue operations. At a May 2006 meeting of State representatives convened
by UNHCR to discuss maritime interception and rescue in the
Mediterranean basin, concern was raised over "the practice
whereby several States were classifying some interception measures as rescue at sea operations, in order to use SAR operational
capacity for such activities.""" This section will first examine potential reasons for this trend, from legal and practical stand203. See id.
6.20.
204. See State Representatives' Meeting on Rescue at Sea and Maritime Interception in the Mediterranean, Chairman's Smnmary,
1, 23-24, Madrid, May 2006.
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points, before assessing the nature of rescue and interception
dialogue at the international level. It will conclude that such dialogue is partly responsible for conflating these normally separate
concepts, further contributing to the practice of "cloaked" interceptions and a weakening of the rescue regime. Key terms are
examined to provide greater clarity and a sharper distinction between rescue and interception.
When, then, is a rescue a rescue, rather than an interception? The answer may lie partly in the motives underlying State
practice. In the first place, calling an act a "rescue" provides an
instant legal basis to interfere with another vessel, particularly on
the high seas, where the limited "right of visit" exceptions may
be otherwise unavailable.2 °5 In short, if a flag vessel is clearly
from another flag State, 2 6 and not under suspicion of smuggling or piracy, no interference with a vessel is permitted without
the flag State's express authority, unless it is in distress. The
combination of the remote and unsupervised high seas locale
combined with increased State pressure to intercept 2 7 makes
rescue a more tempting justification for interference on the high
seas.
The trend is also emerging in response to the relative ease
with which rescue vessels can be discharged of further responsibility following disembarkation. Due to the very recent changes
to the rescue regime designed to improve the efficiency of rescue disembarkations, the problem of "cloaked" interceptions is
likely to get worse. This is because a rescue operation on the
high seas now affords prompt disembarkation coordinated by a
third party (the regional RCC), whereas a high seas interception
affords no clear responsibilities to discharge a protection responsibility. The temptation to characterize an interception as a rescue is therefore strong.
205. The most common grounds permitting a right of visit on the high seas would
involve reasonable suspicion of being: flagless, of another flag, or engaged in smuggling. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
206. That is to say, the vessel is not of the same flag State as the military vessel, nor
is it flagless.
207. The U.S. Coast Guard operates tinder a performance goal "to keep the success rate of undocumented migrants arriving by sea to less than 12%. The remaining
88% of the migrants are to be interdicted at sea, ashore, or be deterred from departing." U.S. Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, Frequently Asked Questions: Coast
Guard Migrant Interdiction, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/AMIO/amiofaq.htm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
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Rescue at sea by a State's military vessels can and does occur
under legitimate circumstances, and the SAR Convention contemplates such vessels playing a valid role in maritime search
and rescue. °s Today, it is not uncommon for a State's marine
military service to be vested with twin rescue and interception
duties-the U.S. Coast Guard is one such example. 209 But what
happens when a dual service State vessel identifies an unseaworthy boat under reasonable suspicion of smuggling? Is the
unseaworthiness of the craft enough to justify a rescue, or is the
strong suspicion of smuggling more determinative of an interception? The response will dictate disembarkation and protection responsibilities for those on board, given that SAR and SOLAS amendments have created one disembarkation scheme for
rescue victims, and the ExCom Conclusion has proposed a separate disembarkation and protection responsibility scheme for intercepted persons. 210 There is not only little explicit guidance
available, 2 ' there remains pervasive confusion as to the distinction between rescue and interception in certain contexts.
In a September 2005 Background Paperfor an Expert Roundtable on Rescue at Sea and Maritime Interception in the Mediterranean,
UNHCR provided a brief overview of the "range of concerns and
objectives" motivating States to intercept. 21

2

Listed among the

factors motivating interception is, "the humanitarian imperative
to come to the aid of those travelling in unseaworthy vessels,"
which "constitutes an added element of interception practices. ' ' 2 11 Such a position is also taken by the U.S. Coast Guard,
for example, which characterizes its Alien Migrant Interdiction
program as involving "primarily" a "humanitarian responsibility
to prevent the loss of life at sea, since the majority of migrant
vessels are dangerously overloaded, unseaworthy or otherwise
208. See generally SAR, supra note 62, ch. 2.
209. See generally U.S. Coast Guard Website, http://www.uscg.mil/uscg.shtm (last
visited Nov. 6, 2006).
210. See UNHCR, Summary of Discussions, supra note 178.
211. The Lisbon Roundtable, which limited its scope to the rescue-at-sea issue, declined to address rescue-at-sea issues involving State military vessels, perhaps because
they are more frequently involved on the interception side of maritime activity. See Sunmary of Discussions supra note 178, at 7.
212. UNHCR, Expert Roundtable on Rescue at Sea and Maritime Interception in
the Mediterranean, Athens, Greece, Sept. 12-13, 2005, Background Discussion Paper,
Reconciling Protection Concerns with Migration Objectives, Protection Policy & Legal
Advice Section, at 7 [hereinafter Athens Background Discussion Paper].
213. Id.
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unsafe. '21 4 Such language clearly equates interception with an
underlying humanitarian-based rescue objective.
If the ExCom position is that vessels responding to persons
in distress at sea are not engaged in interception, how can interception include the humanitarian imperative to aid those in unseaworthy vessels? These seemingly irreconcilable positions were
recognized by the Expert Roundtable 15 convened in Athens to
discuss interception and rescue in the Mediterranean basin, but
no concrete proposals were put forward to address the problem.

2 16

At present, one clear source of guidance appears to be the
ExCom Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures,
which observes in its preamble that "when vessels respond to persons in distress at sea, they are not engaged in interception. 2 17
This provision implies that distress is determinative of rescue, yet
an ambiguity remains over the meaning of the term "distress,"
and the fact that it is frequently conflated with "unseaworthiness" in the maritime context, which is inappropriate. Under a
strict reading of this authoritative, but non-binding clause, any
encounter with a migrant vessel in distress should be characterized as a rescue. 218 Apparently, not even UNCHR is very clear
about how this issue is to be interpreted.
More helpful, perhaps, is the SAR definition of a distress
phase, which may shed some light on the more technical meaning of distress itself. The distress phase is defined as: "A situation wherein there is reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel
or other craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and
requires immediate assistance."21' 9 The "reasonable certainty"
characteristic of the distress phase is distinguished from other
phases that are characterized by either uncertainty or apprehen214. U.S. Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, Alien Migrant Interdiction: Introduction, http://A w-.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/AMIO/AMIO.hti (last xisited Nov. 6,
2006).
215. The Roundtable consisted of "35 participants, drawn from international organisations, academia, non-governinental organizations, the shipping industry and
some national maritime and migration authorities." UNHCR, Summary of Discussions,
supra note 178, [ 1.
216. See UNHCR, Athens Background Discussion Paper, supra note 212.
217. See UNHCR ExComi, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25.
218. Id.
219. SAR, supra note 62, at Annex Ch. 1.3.13.
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sion as to the safety of the vessel. 2 0 This language clearly implies that the unseaworthiness of a vessel is, after all, a matter of
degree, and in order to justify a bona fide rescue operation,
there must be reasonable certainty of grave and imminent danger.
The recent trend of States characterizing interception operations as rescue is a dangerous one. It threatens not only to
weaken the rescue regime by burdening coastal States with undue disembarkation (and screening) responsibility, but constitutes a real risk that persons deserving of international protection will be exposed to harm. A greater clarification of the
boundaries and distinctions between rescue and interception is
necessary to stem the abuse, and a logical starting point is perhaps the SAR definition relating to distress.
C. Addressing Protection Gaps in Interception
As discussed in Section I.D., the key protection gaps arising
in the interception context involve the twin problems of 1) determining the State responsible for initial protection concerns,
so that 2) intercepted refugees can be distinguished from those
not requiring international protection. A significant concern remains that refugees intercepted within broader migration flows

are summarily returned to harm for lack of any uniform procedural standards governing initial screening of such persons.2 2'
At present, there are no international regulations governing disembarkation in the interception context. This section will discuss recent efforts by UNHCR 22 2 and the wider international
community to address and improve refugee protection in the
220. Id.,
1.3.11 & 1.3.12, respectively.
221. See Refugees May Be Caught Up In European Crackdown On Illegal Migant, UN
Nvws SERVI r, Feb. 2, 2005, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/printewsAr.
asp?nid-13214.
222. UNHCR has repeatedly recommended the establishment of: measures distinguishing asylum-seekers from those not in need of international protection, protection
from refoulement, access to status determination procedures, the enjoyment of temporary protection, and the coordination of durable solutions for refugees. It has also
recommended that States channel some of their focus away from border control enforcement towards alternative channels for legal migration. See Perspectives from
UNHCR and IOM, supra note 3. UNHCR, Global Consultations on International Protection, Conclusions and Recommendations from the Regional Meetings in Ottawa and
Macau, EC/GC/01/13 (May 31, 2001) [hereinafter Regional Meetings in Ottawa and
Macau]; UNHCR, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, supra note 26,
34.
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22
maritime context. '

The competing interests of safeguarding international pro-

tection and promoting States' migration control tactics remain
nearly deadlocked, but State practice has the clear upper hand.
A perfect illustration of this tension is found in a Global Consultations paper co-authored by UNHCR and IOM. 224 While 10M
hails interception as "one of the most effective measures to enforce [States'] domestic migration laws and policies, ' 225 UNHCR

soberly observes that, "one of the main challenges resulting from
interception is the difficulty of reconciling this practice with relevant international legal responsibilities. ' 22 6 In effect, UNHCR
suggests that interception activities do not coexist neatly with
States' legal obligations, and that serious concerns have not been
fully resolved.2 2 7 The cooperative effort between the two agen-

cies (and more broadly between the protection community and
the migration control community) is thus severely limited by
these seemingly irreconcilable approaches.
In recent years, UNHCR has examined interception in the
broader migration context, 2 2 in the smuggling/trafficking context, 229 and, most recently, in relation to rescue-at-sea.23 0 The

overriding concern for UNHCR is to incorporate protection
safeguards into interception measures in order to prevent violations of refugee and human rights laws" 3' with a view towards
223. See UNHCR, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, supra note 26,
39-41.
224. See Perspectives from UNHCR and IOM,supra note 3.
225. Id. 14.
226. Id. 35.
227. Id.
34-38.
228. See UNHCR, Regional Meetings in Ottawa and Macau, supra note 222; seealso
UNHCR, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, supra note 26.
229. See UNHCR, Elements for an International Framework, supra note 41.
230. See generally UNHCR, Reconciling Protection Concerns with Migration Objectives, supra note 10; see also UNHCR, Summary of discussions and recommendations,
Expert Meeting on Interception and Rescue in the Mediterranean, Cooperative Responses, Sept. 12-13, 2005, supra note 88.
231. The importance of the issue is reflected by the selection of interception as a
topic for one of the substantive meetings of the third track of the Global Consultations
process in June 2001. UNHCR's Global Consultations on International Protection was
a forum convened in recognition of the fiftieth anniversary of the Refugee Convention,
and the third track meetings were held within the framework of the Executive Committee to tackle issues not adequately covered by the Convention. See generally UNHCR,
Update on Global Consultations on International Protection, supra note 41,
12-16.
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eventually issuing protection guidelines on the subject.2 2 Since
2000, much of this work has focused on identifying gaps and suggesting broad areas for improvement rather than promoting specific rules, criteria, or standards. 23 - A noteworthy exception to
this practice has been a proposed ExCom rule for identifying the
State primarily responsible for addressing protection needs of
intercepted persons. This document has been considered an important milestone 2- 4 for setting out a working definition of interception and proposing clear recommendations to improve protection in the interception context. 2 -5 While the proposed rule
fails to accommodate every interception scenario, it represents
the first concrete effort to create a framework linking intercep2 ,6
tion activities to protection duties for those intercepted.
1. Identifying the State Responsible for Protection of
Intercepted Persons
In October 2003, the ExCom Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures was issued.2" 7 While some of the
recommendations are neither new nor novel 2 38 (many have already been integrated into the Smuggling Protocol),2 the document nonetheless lays the groundwork for UNHCR's eventual
issue of guidelines on refugee protection safeguards in interception measures, forthcoming in the next several months.2 4 °
The ExCom Conclusion proposed to identify the State responsible for protection of intercepted persons as follows: "The
State within whose sovereign territory, or territorial waters, inter232. UNHCR, Perspectives from UNHCR and IOM, supra note 3, 47.
233. See generally UNHCR, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, supra
note 26.
234. See Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 5, at 18.
235. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25 ("[R]ecalling also
Conclusions of the Executive Committee of relevance to the particular needs of asylumseekers and re ugees in distress at sea and affirming that when vessels respond to persons in distress at sea, they are not engaged in interception.")
236. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25.
237. See id.
238. Other recommendations reiterate the importance of distinguishing between
populations in need of protection, and call for protection from prosecution for intercepted asylum-seekers and refugees, the need for swift returns where appropriate, specialized training, information sharing, and further study the impact of interception on
other States. See id.
239. See Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supra
note 4, arts. 5, 9-10, 14, 16, 18.
240. See Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 5, at 18.
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ception takes place has the primary responsibility for addressing
any protection needs of intercepted persons."2 4 ' An examination of this policy, first with regard to its application in the maritime context, and later in a land-based context, is necessary to
assess both the shortcomings of this proposed rule and the policy consequences that are likely to flow from it. Importantly, the
duties that comprise "primary responsibility for addressing any
protection needs" remain ambiguous; there is no formalized
identification or enumeration of basic protection needs. Initial
screening to identify those in need of international protection,
access to formal status determination procedures, and resettlement issues are not addressed, and the door remains open for
possible extraterritorial screening and processing of asylum-seekers, a practice of ambiguous legality. Beyond this deficit, additional problems arise in application of the test.
a. What Happens When State A Intercepts a Vessel in its Own
Territorial Waters?
In this scenario, the ExCom rule produces a logical, practical and fair result: The intercepting State itself is required to
provide the necessary protection safeguards for persons within
its sovereign territory.24 2 Here it is worth recalling that sovereignty in territorial waters is limited only by innocent passageand that passage of vessels seeking to disembark persons in violation of that State's immigration rules is not innocent. 2 4 States
therefore remain free to intercept vessels suspected of violating
domestic migration laws so long as their interception does not
result in any violations of other international legal commitments. 24 4 Now that State A has intercepted the vessel, it is primarily responsible for addressing protection needs, including initial
screening of intercepted persons, to ensure that those in need of
international protection are not summarily returned to harm in
violation of non-refoulement obligations.2 4 5
241. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25.
242. See Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 5, at 18.
243. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25 (stating "interception
is one of the measures employed by States to assert control of vessels when there are
reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is transporting persons contrary to international or national inaritime law.").
244. See id.
245. See UNHCR, Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, supra note 26; see
also Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 5, at 19.
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b. What Happens When State A Intercepts a Vessel in State
B's Territorial Waters?
Under the law of the sea, territorial waters represent an extension of State territory24" and generally, any entry into it other
than innocent passage would require that State's authorization.
In this scenario, the ExCom rule would designate State B, rather
than the intercepting State A, as primarily responsible for protection needs of intercepted persons. 4 7 At first glance, allocating the protection burden to the venue State might seem an
anomalous choice, since the proposed rule essentially allows one
State's interception activity to impose legal protection duties on
another State. However, State B retains sovereign authority over
its own territorial sea, and State A cannot conduct an interception without State B's express permission to do so. 248 Because
State A can only intercept in State B's territorial waters with State
B's express authorization, it is appropriate that State B be designated as having primary protection responsibility over those intercepted within its waters, since its authorization constituted an
exercise of its sovereign authority.2 4 State B had alternatives: It
could have refused permission to State A and conducted the interception itself (in which case it would still have primary protection responsibility) or it could have taken a more proactive
stance and attempted to intercept the vessel further out to sea.25
246. See UNCLOS, supra note 62, at art. 2(1) ("The sovereignty of a coastal State
extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic
State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea").
247. See Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 5, at 18 ("This provision assigns primary
responsibility for the protection of intercepted persons not to the active, intercepting
state, but rather to the passive state within whose territory or territorial waters the interception takes place").
248. The only scenario in which State A's vessel could enter State B's territorial
waters without pernission would be to conduct a rescue under the conditions of UNCLOS Article 18(2), and tinder ExCom's Conclusion No. 97, "when vessels respond to
persons in distress at sea, they are not engaged in interception." Because such a scenario would qualify as a rescue rather than interception, the proposed ExCom rule would
not apply. But whether State A would seek State B's permission to disembark those
rescued, or whether it would treat them as intercepted persons remains unclear. Under
current practice, either option is possible. This problen illustrates the pitfalls of failing
to address rescue disembarkation duties in a manner that foresees State military rescues. The protection duties and responsibilities for military maritime rescue have yet to
be addressed.
249. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25; see also Brouwer &
Kumin, supra note 5, at 18-19.
250. See UNHCR ExCoin, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25.
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This last scenario is a likely policy consequence of the proposed
rule, and will be discussed further below.
c. What Happens When State A Intercepts a Vessel in a
Contiguous Zone (its own or that of another State)?
Traditionally the contiguous zone had been a high seas zone
permitting certain jurisdictional exercises. Today it remains a
zone where States may "exercise the control necessary" to prevent or punish infringement of their immigration laws and regulations, although the extent to which such control encompasses
interception is less clear.25 ' Yet, even assuming that States may
properly conduct interceptions in the contiguous zone, identification of "[t] he State within whose sovereign territory, or territorial waters, interception takes place" is not possible because a
contiguous zone does not represent sovereign territory. This is a
serious shortcoming considering that maritime interception is
recognized as not only a growing phenomenon, but one seem252
Ultiingly endorsed as legitimate in the Smuggling Protocol.

mately, the ExCom rule has no application in the contiguous
zones.
d. What Happens When a State Intercepts a Vessel on the
High Seas?
As with the contiguous zone scenario, the ExCom rule does
not accommodate interceptions occurring on the high seas,
since they are not within any State's sovereign territory. 25 ' This
oversight is so significant that it essentially renders the proposed
rule meaningless on grounds of practical ineffectiveness. As a
practical matter, States prefer to undertake maritime interceptions on the high seas2 54 precisely to prevent vessels from entering the contiguous zone (considered the maritime frontier), or
their territorial waters, where greater protections attach. Such a
preference for high seas interceptions is illustrated by the U.S.
Coast Guard, which maintains bilateral agreements with more
than twenty States permitting it to board foreign flagged ves251.
252.
note 4.
253.
254.

See UNCLOS, supra note 62, art. 33.
See Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supra
See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25.
See Brouwer & Kunin, supra note 5, at 11.
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sels. 255 The U.S. Coast Guard implicitly acknowledges the benefits of high seas interception when it observes that
"[i]nterdicting migrants at sea means they can be quickly returned to their countries of origin without the costly processes
25 6
required if they successfully enter the United States.
e. What Happens with Land-based Interceptions?
The proposed rule is equally problematic when its application is evaluated in the context of non-maritime interceptions,
such as the posting of immigration officers in a foreign airport
to identify false documents and prevent onward travel. In such
scenarios, the extraterritorial nature of interception means that
the intercepting State may be acting from within the confines of
the "venue" State to block undocumented migrants from onward
travel. 25 7 The proposed ExCom rule suggests that the "venue"
State, not the intercepting State, would be primarily responsible
for the protection of intercepted persons. 258 Since land-based
interceptions halt migrants in another State's sovereign territory
(as opposed to the high seas), there is an increased risk that a
prospective refugee may end up trapped inside his/her country
of origin. Therefore, where the venue State constitutes the State
of origin (rather than merely a transit State), interceptions continue to pose protection concerns. 2 59 Applying the ExCom rule
to this scenario would render the State of origin (possibly the
persecuting State) primarily responsible for the protection of
persecuted persons trapped within its borders, 2611 surely an absurd result.
255. See id. at 8.
256. U.S. Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, Alien Migrant Interdiction:

Overview, http://w,.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/AMIO/ AMIO.ltn (last visited Nov. 6,
2006).
257. In other cases, such as those of visa requirements, the so-called intercepting
State may not even maintain a presence in the venue State, allowing that State's authorities to conduct the requisite document checks and to block those not in conformity
from onward travel.
258. See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97, supta note 25.
259. By definition, a refugee must be outside of his/her country of origin in order
to trigger protections under the Refugee Convention. However, while the inability to
leave one's country does not violate Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, it is likely to
constitute a violation of Article 12 of the ICCPR. See HATHAWAY, supra note 34, at 31012.
260. See UNHCR ExCoin, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25.
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2. A Supplemental Proposal

The ExCom rule operates sufficiently well in cases where interception clearly occurs within a State territory; in such cases, it
is the venue State that is assigned primary protection duties.""
The shortcoming of the ExCom rule is its failure to address the
more likely scenarios of interception occurring further out to
sea-in the contiguous zones and on the high seas.
One proposal for improvement would be to provide a supplemental rule that would operate in conjunction with ExCom's existing rule:
The State within whose sovereign territory, or territorial waters, interception takes place has the primary responsibility
for addressing
any protection needs of intercepted per2
sons.

26

[Proposed Supplemental Rule]:
For interceptions taking place beyond the sovereign territory or territorial waters of any State, including the contiguous zones and on the
high seas, the State exercising its jurisdiction over the interception has
the primary responsibilityfor addressingany protection needs of intercepted persons.
Under this proposal, the ExCom rule would apply to interceptions occurring in sovereign territory or territorial waters, and
the Proposed Supplemental Rule would apply to interceptions
beyond the territorial zones.
How would such a rule apply in the contiguous zones?
Where State A intercepts in its own contiguous zone, it has
clearly exercised jurisdiction over the interception and would
reasonably be held primarily responsible for protection matters.
Where State A intercepts in State B's contiguous zone with State
B's permission to intercept, State B would remain primarily responsible for protection of those intercepted. This is so because
State B retains jurisdiction over immigration matters in its own
contiguous zone, and it has exercised its jurisdiction to authorize
State A to act in its contiguous zone. If State B refuses such permission, it retains the option of conducting the interception itself, which it may be free to do within the constraints of interna261. See id.
(a)(1).
262. See UNHCR ExComi, Conclusion No. 97, supra note 25,

(a) (1).
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tional law. Similarly, if State A were to intercept within State B's
contiguous zone without the requisite permission to do so, then
State A would retain primary responsibility for the protection
needs of those intercepted.
How would the proposed rule apply on the high seas? In
the high seas context, the act of interception would trigger a
corresponding protection duty upon the intercepting State as
the actor exercising its jurisdiction over the vessel. The loophole
in ExCom's present rule currently has several consequences.
First, it is likely to lead to a decline in interceptions in the territorial sea because it is presently the only maritime zone in which
protection duties clearly attach. Where a State intercepts in its
own territorial sea, it is essentially penalized for not having intercepted further out to sea where it could have sidestepped primary protection responsibilities. Where a State permits another
to intercept in its sovereign territory (both on land and at sea), it
is similarly penalized by having to assume protection responsibilities. 263 In consequence of this, the ExCom rule is likely to indirectly encourage push-backs and high seas interceptions.
The supplemental rule proposed above would eliminate
these consequences by attaching protection duties to all interceptions, regardless of the maritime zone in which they occur.
Moreover, it would create an equitable and consistent outcome
by equating the exercise of jurisdiction with a concomitant protection duty for those intercepted. The proposal has its limitations, however. Most obviously, instances involving more than
one State exercising jurisdiction, (such as where a flag State authorizes a foreign-flagged vessel to intercept) are inevitable and
will admittedly raise more complex issues of shared jurisdiction.
Additionally, it is conceivable that in the foreseeable future
States will contemplate "outsourcing" interception duties to private contractors, which may or may not operate under that
State's flag. This practice of relying on private companies to provide a traditionally public service has already emerged in the
maritime context when it was reported last year that Somalia had
contracted with a private U.S. company to help protect its shores
from attacks by pirates along its coastline. 2 4 Another scenario
raising similar issues is the sub-contracting out to other States for
263. Id.
264. See US. Firm to Fight Somali Pirates,BBC NEws, Nov. 25, 2005, http://news.bbc.
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high seas interception activities, which may also emerge over
time. 5
Ultimately, while the ExCom proposal is a useful starting
point, it has yet to engage with more troublesome and complex
aspects of maritime interception and international legal obligations. Significantly, it fails to apply in the contiguous or high
seas zones, perversely allowing States to avoid protection responsibilities there. Second, the document fails to clarify what is entailed in protection responsibilities. Here, what is needed is
strict language concerning both disembarkation and initial
screening. Third, the document scrupulously avoids the issue of
extraterritorial disembarkation, detention, and processing. Guidance as to the legal ramifications of such actions is sorely
needed. Finally, a uniform protocol governing initial screening
to carefully identify those in need of international protection to
prevent refoulement is also sorely needed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the last twenty years there has been a persistent effort to
strengthen refugee safeguards in rescue and interception contexts, but little progress until very recently. In the rescue context, treaty amendments to SOLAS and SAR that entered into
force in July 2006 create greater clarity surrounding disembarkation by designating the regional rescue centre with primary responsibility for coordinating rescue and ensuring that survivors
are disembarked and delivered to a place of safety. By formally
closing a longstanding maritime loophole, the amendments
should help restore the integrity and viability of a humanitarian
practice that relies largely on commercial vessels as its first line
of defense. However, the amendments themselves are silent as
to the meaning of a "place of safety," and attempted clarification
co.k/go/pr/fr/-/ 1/hi /world/ africa/ 4471536.stm (reporting on a two-year, $50 million contract to a US firm to fight piracy off the coasts of Somalia).
265. When the private contractors failed to appear to protect the Somali coastline,
the Somali government signed a contract with the U.S. Navy to provide assistance in
protecting its territorial waters from pirates operating off its coasts. See id; see also U.S. to
Help Tackle Somali Pirates, BBC NrWs, Apr. 17, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/
1/hi/world/africa/4915726.stm. Although such an agreement demonstrates an exercise of Somali jurisdiction to allow the U.S. Navy to operate within its own territorial
waters, such a scenario raises broader questions about the possibility of a state delegating its own high seas interception duties to another State, which raises novel jurisdictional issues.
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of this key term remains relegated to a non-binding set of guidelines, which raise further potential for confusion. In particular,
the guidelines themselves define a place of safety in a way that
leaves open the possibility of survivors being disembarked onto
yet another vessel, thereby failing to definitively resolve the disembarkation issue. The success of these amendments in solving
the disembarkation problem in the rescue context will be determined over time.
In the interception context, there is some acknowledgement in the ExCom Conclusion that international protection
duties must flow from the control exerted by State-based interception practices, but conceptual problems nonetheless remain.
The ExCom provision for identifying the State responsible for
screening and protection fails to apply throughout every maritime zone, creating incentives for States to intercept on the high
seas. A proposed supplemental rule would impose legal obligations on the State exercising jurisdiction over interceptions in
the contiguous zones and on the high seas, although its acceptability to States is less clear. Additional shortcomings remain: the
absence of any uniform procedural standards governing initial
screenings for intercepted persons, and silence on the issue of
responsibility concerning extraterritorial detention, processing
and protection arrangements.
Finally, dialogue at both scholarly and diplomatic levels
reveals concern over an emerging State practice in which interceptions are being characterized as rescue operations, so that
States may take advantage of SAR disembarkation procedures
and quickly divest themselves of concomitant protection responsibilities. There is a serious need to clarify when an action taken
by military vessels validly constitutes a rescue operation, and
when it is a maritime interception. Failure to address this issue
in a clear and authoritative manner will undermine the recent
attempts to strengthen the rescue instruments by allowing interception to inappropriately co-opt rescue resources. While States
remain resistant to self-regulation in this regard, the UNHCR
should be encouraged to issue comprehensive guidelines
sooner, rather than later.

